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RATIONALIZING THE
ALLOCATIVE/DISTRIBUTIVE
RELATIONSHIP IN COPYRIGHT
Jeffrey L. Harrison*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The language of the 1976 Copyright Act' providing protection of
"original works of authorship ' 2 contains words that should and could
very well mean something. After all, it is with these words that Congress
permits individuals to create property and to internalize its benefits. One
need not look very far to determine how trivial these requirements3
actually are. In Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
a 1991 case, Justice O'Connor addressed the issue of originality 4 for a
unanimous Court and described the requirement as "minimal," "slight,"
and satisfied by a "modicum of creativity." 5 The requirement of
authorship has been similarly treated. Thus, in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid,6 Justice Marshall tackled the concept of "author"
with the pithy observation
that an "author is the party who actually
7
creates the work.",
*

Stephen C. O'Connell Chair. College of Law, The University of Florida. Thanks to Sarah

Harrison for her assistance.
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (amending 17 U.S.C. in its
entirety).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
3. 499U.S.340(1991).
4. See id at 345-46. The originality requirement can be seen as having two components. One
is that the work not be copied from another. The other is that there be some element of creativity.
This is an important distinction because a work that is not copied is copyrightable even if it tums
out to be the same as an existing work. See id.; see also Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality,34
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 805-11 (1993).
5. Feist,499 U.S. at 345-46.
6. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
7. Id. at 737; see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d
Cir. 1951) (stating that individuals may be authors though they did not intend the outcome
produced); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (defining author as
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What seems clear from the emptiness of these definitions is that the
copyright system in the United States 8 operates like a huge, publiclysupported lottery system. One enters this lottery for a pittance of
creativity and rides the tide of the market toward financial success or
failure. Anyone with a smattering of inventiveness can create and lay
claim to a piece of "property" and fend off those with similarly
wonderful or, more likely, cheesy ideas. Even the talented person may
be tempted to engage in "satisficing" 9 creativity. Like a lottery, the
process is largely one of distributing the wealth generated by limited
creativity rather than encouraging overall growth in wealth or cultural
well-being.
What copyright law invites is a process similar to that taking place
under conditions that economists call "monopolistic competition."' 0
Under a monopolistically competitive industry structure, large numbers
of competitors sell goods or services for which substitutes are readily
available. The distinctions among them are likely to be minor. In
economics, this is the land of cheap and short-term thrills. Each
competitor attempts to achieve some advantage over other competitors
by virtue of relatively small differences. The differences can be minor
and involve largely illusory distinctions, like more appealing colors on
the label of a can of peas or the image portrayed through an ad
campaign." The key is to exploit these small advantages without any
real hope of achieving the level of market power associated with
products or sellers offering goods for which there are few substitutes. 2
"'he to whom anything owes its origin"') (citation omitted). The Court in Burrow-Giles did,
however, refine the analysis to suggest that the work must represent the author's conception. See id.
at 60; see also infra text accompanying notes 171-87.
8. For some international comparison, see infra notes 76-78.
9. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM.
ECON. REv. 493 (1979). Simon describes satisficing behavior like this: "[Olne could postulate that
the decision maker had formed some aspiration as to how good an alternative he should find. As
soon as he discovered an alternative for choice meeting his level of aspiration, he would terminate
the search and choose that alternative." Id. at 503. On one hand, it seems unrealistic to believe that
people have in mind the minimal standards of copyright law when engaged in creative activity. On
the other hand, if the proposition is stated differently, it does not seem as farfetched. Thus, creative
people might aim higher if the right to claim exclusive rights to their work hinged on this. In
general, however, the notion of satisficing creative efforts would seem to fit better in the context of
business sponsored work for hire. Here, the objective is hardly to be as creative as possible but to
satisfy business goals.
10. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 168-70 (15th ed.
1995).
11. Some small distinctions may be small, but not trivial like the location of a gas station on
one comer of an intersection as opposed to another.
12. Monopolistic competition is discussed in greater detail at infra text accompanying notes
127-47.

RA TIONALIZING COPYRIGHT

2004]

In fact, in monopolistically competitive industries profits tend to be low
because there is really no way to stem the tide of new entrants once one
has found a new recipe or gimmick. 13 Although it would be unfair to
view all copyrighted works as falling into the mold of monopolistic
competition, it is the position of this Article that the benefits of a regime
of copyright law can be maintained while shedding at least some of the
wastefulness of monopolistic competition.
Both copyright lottery and monopolistic competition are
characterized by an emphasis on wealth-shifting over wealth-creation. In
economic terms, this is the difference between distributive effects and
allocative effects. Distributive issues arise when individuals struggle
over how a certain amount of wealth is to be divided up. Allocative
matters, on the other hand, concern the process of guiding resources into
their most valued uses. There is a general sense in this country that our
copyright law has a strong allocative emphasis. In fact, Article 1, Section
8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact laws
pertaining to copyright, reads that the power is "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.' 14 The end is to benefit the public. The means is to
permit creative people to internalize the benefits of their efforts by
limiting free riding. 15 Thus, Justice Hughes wrote for the Supreme Court
in the 1932 case, Fox Films Corp. v. Doyal,16 "[t]he sole interest of the
United States... in conferring [a copyright] lie[s] in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."' 7 Similarly, in 1948, in
United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc., s Justice Douglas expressed it
as, "[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the
' 9
[author] a secondary consideration."' Finally in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 20
decided last term, the Court assessed the rationality of a copyright term
21
extension by reference to incentives for authors.

13.

See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 10, at 169-70.

14. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl.
8.
15. Free riding occurs when producers are unable to capture, through consumption or sales,
the benefits of their efforts. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND BEUAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 68 (2002).
16. 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
17. Id.at 127.
18. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

19. Id. at 158; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
20.

537 U.S. 186 (2003).

21. See id.at 214-17. The distinction, made most clearly by Justice Breyer in his dissent, is
between "rewards" for authors and the "end" of social benefit. Id. at 246-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Despite this consensus, the Copyright Act itself and judicial
interpretations have forced American copyright law to be principally
about distributive issues.22 Specifically, if one examines the Act, the vast
majority of its provisions ranging from fair use to compulsory licensing
are ultimately about distributive issues.23 In some respects this makes
sense because when difficult distributive issues are resolved, beneficial
allocative effects may flow automatically. Distributive battles, however,
are almost always about the well-being of private parties, and they are
not necessarily connected to ends that result in advancing a generalized
societal goal.24 Whether accruing to the benefit of the public or not,
these distribution-determining costs are largely absorbed by the public.
Yet no one has suggested that in providing for the development of
intellectual property, the Founding Fathers had in mind a public system
for resolving disputes between similarly unimaginative people.
The importance of the distinction between allocative and
distributive ends and the relevance of the Copyright Act and judicial
interpretations can be understood by focusing on copyright law's
requirements with respect to creativity and authorship. With respect to
creativity, consider the example of Tom Clancy, the popular best-selling
author. Without judging the quality of his work as "literature," it is a fact
that the public anxiously awaits the latest Tom Clancy novel. Mr. Clancy
would doubtless be less likely to write if others were permitted, as soon
as his new offering were published, to copy and sell it to others without
remitting a royalty fee to him. In short, in order for Tom Clancy to bring
his considerable story-telling talents to the table he must be assured of a
payoff. Copyright means that he gets the payoff by making it unlawful
for others to immediately copy and sell his novels as their own.
Contrast Mr. Clancy with Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King
of Florida,Inc.,26 in which a manufacturer of beach towels claimed its
copyrighted but typical palm-tree-with-island-and-water image was
22.

The costs of making these decisions is actually a cost of the copyright system itself. See

infra Part II; see also William M, Landes, Copyright, BorrowedImages, and AppropriationArt: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 7 (2000).
23. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use limitations on exclusive rights to copyright);

§ 11 (d) (requirement of compulsory license for secondary transmission of primary work); § 115
(requirement of compulsory license for the making and distributing of phonorecords).
24. In other instances, they may be a means to the end of advancing social welfare. See infra
text accompanying notes 61-62.

25. It has also been argued that these minimal standards decrease the size of the public
domain. See Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a StricterOriginalityStandardfor Copyright Law, 43 B.C.
L. REv. 193, 225-26 (2001); see also Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L. J. 249, 249-54 (1997).
26. 753 F.2d 1565 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
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copied by a competitor. 27 The plaintiff had actually reproduced, with
very slight variation, its "original" design from an unprotected image.28
It was in effect a derivative work.2 9 The defendant/competitor would be
guilty of infringement if the derivative work itself was protected. The
trial court held that it was. 30 The appellate court reversed, finding that
the changes from the older work to the new were too trivial to warrant
protection. 31 This generated a prolonged dispute over attorney's fees
including another appeal.32 The catalyst for this entire exercise was the
lack of a serious creativity requirement, a deficiency that leads to the
reasonable belief that even a small change in an already trivial piece of
artistry
would entitle one to the property rights granted by copyright
33
law.
It is hard not to see a case like this as anything other than pure loss.
There is no specific demand for what was a generic tropical image on a
beach towel. Far more importantly, there is no reason to conclude that,
but for copyright law, there would be a shortage of cheesy beach towel
designs. The capacity to create images agreeable to sun bathers is
abundant. Like toothpicks and salt, beach towel images are commodities.
They would likely exist without any copyright protection at all.34 Thus,
copyright law does not give rise to beach towel art, but it does give rise
to squabbles over the spoils of beach towel sales. Aside from the cost of
solving the distributive question created by a standard-free system of
copyright, there may be a more important loss. It seems likely that the
current approach to creativity has the impact of "dumbing down" the
level of creativity. Why take risks on efforts to be truly creative when,
27. See id at 1565. By examining the reported opinion, most if not all readers would probably
agree that any social or cultural benefit advanced by the towel design is difficult to identify.
28. See id at 1566.
29. A derivative work is a work based on one or more preexisting works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
30. See 753 F.2d at 1568.
31. See id. at 1568-69. A similar example of low standards inviting copyright mischief is
EmanationInc. v. Zomba RecordingInc., 72 Fed. Appx 187 (5thCir. 2003).
32. See Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir.
1987).
33. For a similar example of reasonable belief, see Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir.
1914), and infra text accompanying notes 116-22. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co.
697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982) suggests that courts can be ambivalent and may send conflicting signals
about the level of required creativity. In the space of a few pages, the court calls for "substantial, not
merely trivial, originality," id at 34 (quoting L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490
(2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)), then "non-trivial contributions," 697 F.2d at 34, and finds the required
level of originality in an artist's efforts to smooth the lines and make minor changes to a previously
existing illustration, see id. at 34-35.
34. See infra Part Ill.Al.
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with only the slightest uninspired effort, one can create property? In
short, the current standard may encourage satisficing creativity and
underachievement.
The minimal standard is repeated, if not eliminated altogether,
when it comes to the question of authorship. Take the example of two
photographers. The first is Joel Meyerowitz, perhaps best known for his
photos of Cape Cod cottages. Here is his answer to an interviewer's
question about a change in his approach to photography:
At the beginning of the 1970s I had been seeking a high quality of
description using Kodachrome 35mm, which was an extraordinary
material in those days. However, I couldn't get what I wanted on a
print-they had to be dye transfers and were too expensive. So there
were a number of issues, mechanical and technical, that were
interceding. I tried working with a medium-format camera in 1970-a
6 x 9 cm camera using color negative film-because just about that
time I began making prints in my darkroom. But that camera was so
slow that I began to lose the kind of image that I was making on the
street. I decided, "If I'm going to put this camera on a tripod, I might
as well put a big camera on a tripod, and get back all the description."
Consequently I got an 8 x 10 and began to photograph.
Working with 35mm calls up a specific energy and the freedom of.
making a gesture with a camera. You hold a small camera in your
hand, something happens in front of you, and click, you take a picture.
A hand-held camera allows you to react in a split second. With an 8 x
10 camera your approach to things is much more meditative. The basic
difference was one of mechanics at first. What you can do with a small
camera in your hand you can't do with an 8 x 10 big box on a five-foot
high tripod. But for me there was the need to bring one experience to
bear on the other. I saw in the 35mm color a kind of quality of
description that 35mm black and white didn't have. Something about
the way Kodachrome II described things was so cohesive, grainless,
smooth, creamy. The color itself added this extra dimension of
description. A red coat in yellow sunlight and blue shadows didn't
come out medium gray, it came out exciting and35stimulating. I thought,
"I want to describe that in my photographs too."
Contrast this with the case of Abraham Zapruder, a dressmaker and
also an "author," who on November 22, 1963 attempted to film a
motorcade carrying President Kennedy.36 There is no indication that
35. CREATING A SENSE OF PLACE 7-8 (Constance Sullivan & Susan Weiley eds., Smithsonian
Institution Press 1990) (excerpt of an interview with Joel Meyerowitz).
36. See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Zapruder planned for or anticipated that his movie camera would record
the images it did. In contrast to Joel Meyerowitz, there was no
preconception that could be linked to the images actually fixed by
Zapruder.37 In essence, Zapruder became an author for copyright
purposes by turning the camera on and making other trivial choices that
were independent of what eventually gave value to his film. As in the
case of creativity, the question is whether extending copyright protection
to the Zapruder's of the world has an allocative effect or simply a
distributive effect. Put differently, would Zapruder-like "works" exist in
the absence of copyright law? The answer is almost certainly yes. In
these instances, and perhaps others,3 8 there was neither commercial
intent nor the promise of the development of any skill or insight that
public policy seeks to promote. The wealth from such happenstance is a
pure windfall and simply opens the door to distributive battles.
This Article cuts against the grain of modem copyright law by
making the case that a more substantive approach to the issues of
creativity and authorship would lower costs, streamline the system, and
raise the level of socially beneficial creativity. Increasing the creativity
requirement is designed to curb what might be called "artistic product
differentiation" that has no real impact on economic, cultural, and social
development. 39 Infusing an element of substance into authorship by
requiring some level of preconception by authors would produce the
same result. After all, except in the most unusual instances, when an
author does not know until after the fact that he has "created" something,
it is hard to make a case that an incentive to create played a role.40
Raising both of these standards would reduce costly, and perhaps
chilling, 41 distributive battles and properly focus copyright on the
internalization of efforts that are more likely to advance the public
interest by raising the level of creative contribution.42
37. Evidently Mr. Zapruder did spend some time selecting the best location from which to
film the motorcade. See id.
38. For a discussion of other "aleatory art," see infra Part IV.B. 1.
39. Although I argue for a higher creativity standard, I do not explore in great depth precisely
what form that standard might take. For a thorough treatment of this question, see generally
VerSteeg, supra note 4.
40.

But see Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. &

MARY L. REV. 569, 637-38 (2002).
41. One of the consequences of the low standards is that virtually any effort arguably can be
seen as infringing another.
42. The operative approach here is one that emphasizes the interplay between the "thickness"
and "thinness" of copyright protection and the copyright term as they interact to provide a certain
quantum of protection. By "thickness" and "thinness" I mean the breadth of protection afforded the
substantive creative elements. The idea is that a certain amount of protection can be the combination
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It is probably not realistic to expect these measures to be adopted in
the near term. The internationalization of intellectual property law may
have fueled something of a race to the bottom. In a system of essentially
reciprocal copyright protection and in a time in which each country
wants to claim for its citizens as much intellectual property as possible,
the trend for standards is likely to be downward for some time. But just
as the costs of minimal standards discussed here are part of the
American system, these same costs will also become internationalized.
Whether countries can agree to limit costs by clearing the underbrush of
creativity remains to be seen.
Before addressing creativity and authorship directly, there are two
preliminary steps. First, in Section II, I will elaborate on the
allocative/distributive distinction and their interconnectedness. In
Section III, I will focus on an enhanced creativity standard and argue
that an elevated standard is unlikely to cause anything of value to be lost.
I make the point that whatever loss we may feel in the form of less
"commodity art" likely will be replaced by boosting the efforts of
creative people to bring to the market works that would not otherwise
exist. In this section, I also address concerns that greater judicial
involvement may have an undesirable substantive impact by advancing
one view of art or creativity over another. I turn to the matter of
authorship in Section IV. Here the objective is to show how
preconception is crucial to a system of copyright that places allocative
interests ahead of others. In this context, it is important to keep in mind
the distinction here between creativity and authorship. Even if a work
passes the creativity test, the absence of critical elements of authorship
would mean the work does not qualify for protection.
II.

THE ALLOCATIVE/DISTRIBUTIVE DISTINCTION IN COPYRIGHT

I have already described how economists tend to divide issues into
their distributive and allocative effects. Additional examples may be
useful. The most basic one concerns the formation of a contract. If I sell
my Silberstein watch to you it is a safe bet, in most instances, that I
value it less than you do. Suppose the value to me is $4500 and the value
to you is $5500. The exchange of the watch is said to be allocatively
efficient because it winds up in the hands of a person who places greater

of different levels of the breadth of protection and the length of the copyright terms. This Article
proposes raising the "modicum" standard and providing a thicker level of protection for a shorter
period of time. See infra Part III.D.
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value on it.43 In this hypothetical, although we know it makes sense for
you to buy the watch, we still have to decide what the price will be. This
second issue is the distributive one.
These two issues arise in a virtually endless variety of
circumstances. A great chef and a decorator may join to create a unique
dining venue (allocative) and decide how to divide the profits if they are
successful (distributive). A lyricist and a musician may create a joint
work as a theme for a film (allocative), but first decide how to divide
any income that is generated. And, obviously, a novelist may decide to
create a new work for a publisher (allocative), but not before deciding
whether there will be an advance and, if so, how much and what the
level of royalties will be (distributive). It is important to see these issues
as both separate and intertwined because a decision to engage in an
allocative effort almost always requires a solution to the distributive
question. 44
A.

SeparatingDistributiveandAllocative Issues

This conceptual separation allows one to make a rough judgment
about which interest predominates. The thesis of this Article is that
distributive issues dominate all too often in copyright and that these
distribution-determining costs can be reduced without having a
significant allocative effect. Two specific examples-one legislative and
one judicial-illustrate this separateness. In 1998, Congress passed the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.45 The principal impact of
the Act was to extend copyright protection from the life of the author
plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years.4 6 More
importantly, the Act applied retroactively.4 7 That is, if an author created
a work that was scheduled to lose protection in 2000, he or she received
a windfall in terms of the extension. It is useful to compare the impact
on an author who has already created a work with an author who has yet
to create a work. In the second instance, the argument can be made that
43. Assuming the exchange does not make those who are not party to it worse off, the
exchange is Pareto Superior to the prior distribution of the watch and money. This is because both
parties are said to be better off after the exchange. Total utility is increased. In addition, wealth,
another possible measure of efficiency, is also increased. See generally HARRISON, supra note 15, at
50-60.
44. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in 3 THE
COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 18, 35 (Robert C. Merton ed., 1972).

45.
46.
47.
Supreme

Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
See id. § 102(b)(1)-(2).
See id. § 102(c)-(d). The constitutionality of the Act was challenged and upheld by the
Court. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
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the twenty-year extension increases the income the author earns for
works yet to be created and, therefore, provides an incentive to produce
more. 48 In short, the impact is distributive and allocative. In the case of
the work that is already in existence, the impact is strictly distributive
and whatever effort the author makes to protect the income associated
with the twenty-year windfall cannot be seen as beneficial to the public
generally.4 9
My second example may concern abstract music aficionados, but I
think the point remains valid, and it serves to illustrate that the issue of
separation is not always as easily resolved as it is in the case of
retroactive term extension. John Cage's "composition" 4 '33" 50 consists
of a person sitting in front of a piano and not playing for four minutes
and thirty-three seconds.5 During that time, various sounds may take
place-breathing, fabric-rustling, wind, whatever-and this could all be
recorded.52 Allocatively, I would argue that nothing much and perhaps
nothing at all has happened here. 53 The choice to allow silence to occur
or even to record the sounds that break the silence is hardly a creative
effort.54 Although it may not seem like it at times, there is in fact an
infinite supply of silence.55 Granted, this may be best viewed as
"background silence." There is also an infinite supply of naturally
occurring sounds. The process of gathering people into a room to listen
to silence in order to record the sounds that may occur is, at best,
recording the "performance of others or of nature," which actually could
48. This point is at best arguable because the present value of benefits the author will receive
fifty years after creating the work is likely to be quite small for the party actually creating the work.
The benefits may not be small for those buying the rights to the work, but this is separate from the
issue of creation.
49. In fairness, the majority in Eldredv. Ashcroft does make a stab at tying the distributive
impact to allocative ends. The argument is, in effect, that past authors may have been motivated by
knowing that any future term extensions would apply to them. The decision in Eldred, therefore,
was comparable to closing that implicit bargain. See 537 U.S. at 214-15.
50. For a description and discussion, see Larry J. Solomon, The Sounds of Silence, available
at http://www.azstamet.com/-solo/4min33se.htm (1998).
51. The keyboard lid was opened and closed to signify the end and beginning of each
movement. See id.
52. See id
53. 1do not want to suggest that the idea of silence or aleatory art is worthless, but ideas are
not protected by the copyright laws. This is a theme to which I return, see infra Part IV.B, where I
argue that most, if not all, aleatory art is best placed on the idea side of the idea-expression
dichotomy.
54. At best, I would say that Cage produced an idea which would not qualify for protection
under the Copyright Act.
55. For those who prefer their silence recorded, listening to the space between cuts on a CD or
record will do the trick. For live performances, the time between movements at a performance of
classical music will provide a respectable amount of silence.
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violate the rights of those being recorded. The recognition that virtually
anything is copyrightable is not a cost-free decision. In the context of
4'33" the question is whether newer efforts to create a pause in a
composition during which natural and uncontrolled sound may occur are
infringements. This may be far-fetched but, in fact, in the context of
4'33" the issue has arisen. In effect, "creative" effort that produced
what is in abundant supply has itself led to a
nothing more than 56
distributive question.
Typically, there are allocative and distributive elements in every
work and the importance of each is likely to vary with how novel 57 the
work is. For example, it may be that a new fabric pattern consisting of
large yellow and blue dots would be copyrightable. 8 Another producer
may create a similar pattern setting off a distributive battle. In this case
the allocative importance of the second work may exist but is
insignificant. On the other hand, a new novel by an accomplished
novelist may also set off a distributive battle, but that may be relatively
unimportant compared to the fact that there is an addition to the body of
creative works.
B. The Inseparabilityof Distributiveand Allocative Interests
The two interests, although conceptually separate, are also tied
together in a way that makes them inseparable. Take again the example
of the new novel by a respected novelist and suppose the novelist is
driven to some extent to write by the incentive of collecting royalties on
his or her work. The "collecting royalties" part of this assumption
automatically brings into play the distributive. In fact, to the extent
wealth is a factor in the decision to write, one could say that the desired
allocative outcome depends on the author's belief that he or she will win
the distributive dispute. Seen in this way, resolution of the distributive
issue can be seen as the means to the end of achieving a desired
allocative outcome. Justice Breyer captures this relationship in his
dissent in Eldred v. Ashcrof 5 9 when he emphasizes that rewards to
authors are a means to an end.6 ° Similarly, it is reflected in the
56. See Listen Hard: Silence is Golden, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 2002 at 67 (stating that a pop
music producer's failure to pay royalties for the addition of one minute of silence to a band's debut
record, although attributed in part to Cage, got him "into trouble with Cage's ... publisher").
57. Of course, copyright does not require that the work be "novel."
58. For a similar fact pattern in an actual case, see N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972
F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1992).
59. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
60. See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unanimous opinion in Mazer v. Stein6 1 in which the Court reasoned that
"[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant.., copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
62
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare."
In fact, a close look at the Copyright Act of 1976 reveals just how
important distributive matters are. The majority of provisions of the Act
address distributive questions. These range from the definition of a joint
work 63 to fair use64 and the multiple other exceptions to the author's
"exclusive rights., 65 Resolution of these distributive matters takes up not
only a great deal of the statute but a great deal of public and private
resources. Yet, these issues are only a means to an end and the public
outlay is unwarranted unless there is a recognizable positive allocative
effect.
Although the remainder of this Article is devoted to the idea that a
greater creativity requirement and more attention to the process of
authorship will make what amounts to a public investment in solving
distributive questions more worthwhile, there is no economic or
numerical formula that can be used to compare allocative and
distributive interests. One could claim to "score" allocative importance
versus distribution-determining and other costs and decide whether the
allocative gain offsets the distributive costs. This would take the form of
comparing the value of the work produced with the costs determining
the distributive outcomes much like a traditional costibenefit analysis in
hopes of determining an efficient level of copyright protection. 66 At a
narrow theoretical level this seems to make sense but ultimately, and for
a variety of reasons, I am not sanguine about the possibility of such an
approach.
First, it is not at all clear that the value of an expression can be
monetized in preparation for a cost/benefit comparison. The value of the
expression may not be recognized or even recognizable by those
currently alive or in positions of authority. Second, the concept of value
in economic terms means value attached to a willingness and ability to
pay. Yet various works may create utility for those who are unable to
pay for them. In a standard valuation this benefit would not be counted.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Id. at 219.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See § 107.
See §§ 108-122.

66. For an example of a formal theory, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325 (1989).

2004]

RA TIONALIZING COPYRIGHT

Finally, even though it is probably right to view the distributiondetermining costs as losses from the point of view of social welfare that
may not be absolutely true. Studies indicate that people do derive utility
from a sense that justice, including distributive justice, has been
achieved.6 7 Thus, the distributive determination cannot be written off
entirely as an allocative loss.
Three different types of considerations also counsel against a
cost/benefit approach by highlighting its complexity. First, it is not clear
that distribution-determining costs in the context of trivial levels of
creativity are the only "cost" of the "modicum" standard. There may be
costs-or at least inherent disadvantages-of a system that awards not
creativity per se but "production" of something that is merely different.
This facet of the analysis also requires attention to what it means to be a
creator rather than a producer. By producer or production, I mean
bringing something into existence by being able to harness principally
financial resources.68 By creator, I mean the use of some inherent talent
or ability that is the outcome of a cognitive process. A reference to the
film industry is useful. Typically, one thinks of the producer as the
person who brings together investors and various inputs in order to
produce a new film "product." On the other hand, it is the writers and
director who bring emotions and creative insight to the project. The
point here, then, is that the modicum standard elevates and rewards
production perhaps at the expense of creativity. Any conventional
cost/benefit analysis is unlikely to allow for this impact. 69
Second, it is not clear by a long shot that much of that which barely
makes the modicum standard will be lost if it falls beneath a new and
higher creativity standard.7 ° In other words, it may be overstating the
case to assume that those works that would fall below a higher standard
would not be produced at all. Third, raising the standard may simply
mean that creative people aim higher and actually produce more works

67. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994).

68. In his article Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic
Approach, supra note 22, William Landes seems to approach the issue of whether something should
be regarded as "original" by determining whether there would be free riding on the efforts to the
artist if the work were not regarded as original. See id. at 12-17. This too involves interpreting
copyright from a functional perspective but does not distinguish copyright from any other
productive effort. See infra text accompanying note 81.
69. In particular, the model presented by Professor Landes and Judge Posner, see supra note
68, seems not to distinguish between production and creativity as both could be affected by free
riding.
70. This may or may not be a good thing.
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that reach above the higher standard. 7 1 Below, I flesh out each of these
refinements and propose a way to adjust the modicum standard upward.
C. Three Rules
What these complexities mean is that a comparison of allocative
gains and distribution-determining costs must be approached with
considerable caution. This caution dictates being perhaps overly
protective of creative efforts even when possible distributive costs may
be substantial and leads to three rules: (1) Copyright protection and the
consequent distribution-determining costs are unnecessary when the
work would exist without the protection; (2) Copyright protection and
the distribution-determining costs are unnecessary when the market
produces very close substitutes for the protected works; and
(3) Copyright protection should be unavailable where the author's effort
is devoted to method or process rather than expression. This rule may
seem consistent with current copyright law but, as the discussion will
illustrate, method and process are often protected.
Rule one actually involves two applications. The first is when
exclusivity is not the driving factor behind the creation of the work but
creates an opportunity for additional income. The second is when there
are private means of sufficient internalization available that would result
in production of the work without copyright protection. 2 In both of
these instances, the distributive question is about what economists
technically call rents-income in excess of that necessary to bring a
factor into production. In actuality, there may be instances in which
these circumstances are combined. Going back to the examples given
earlier, the first application would apply to instances like the Zapruder
film. The second application involves works by known artists or other
instances in which ownership of the original is highly valued.
Rule two applies when the new work amounts to product
differentiation indistinguishable from that found in the case of run-ofthe-mill products in which producers attempt to derive some short-term
profit by minimal changes. Rule three applies to aleatory art and other
creations that are not the result of a preconception. This includes
instances in which the work owes its existence to a plan or idea for
71.

This is another point that I think is missing from conventional analysis as presented by

Professor Landes and Judge Posner.
72. This possibility will not be addressed here because it does not directly relate to the
concepts of creativity and authorship. The question remains, however, of why the seller of a unique
item cannot fully internalize any gains from subsequent copying or display at the time of the first
sale.
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producing expression, but in which the author is not actually connected
to the expression.73 In all of the cases, the public subsidization of a rent
collection 74 process by authors makes little sense. The following
heightened standards for creativity and authorship are explored with
these rules in mind.
III.

CREATIVITY

75
Although subject to all manner of tweaking, a "modicum-times-2
standard might be articulated as "requiring more than minimal expertise,
skill, taste, or judgment" 76 and that the work be "capable of being
distinguished from other ordinary objects. 77 This standard is consistent
with the first two guidelines described above. An author would be one
who expresses a previously conceived notion involving skill, taste or
judgment.78 It is critical to understand the link between these definitions
and the allocative role of copyright law. These definitions have three
effects. The first is that they require more creativity than currently
required under the 1976 Copyright Act. A corollary is that they require
authors to aim modestly higher. First, even if satisficing behavior is the
norm, the effect is to raise the level of creativity. Second, they increase
the risks for some creative people. These are artists who are principally
driven by economic gain and who are marginally, if at all, talented.
Third, they build in an element of intention and, thus, eliminate much
authorship that is largely about production methods and ideas other than
creativity.79
Before addressing the relationship between the raised standard and
allocative goals, it bears noting that the modicum standard does have

73. In other words, what is necessary is something similar to the Japanese requirement that
what is produced reflects "the thoughts ... or emotions ... [of the author] expressed in a creative
way." TERUO Doi, JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 29-30 (2001).
74. By "rent," I am referring to income above that necessary to call a resource into
production. See KENYON A. KNOPF, A LEXICON OF ECONOMICS 88 (1991).

75.

This is not to suggest a higher standard is actually subject to quantification.

76.

See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN & BENTLEY J. ANDERSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN

GLOBAL MARKETS 90-94 (1997) (describing Canadian copyright law). Another scholar describes
the Canadian standard as "more than negligible." See PAUL E. GELLER & MELVIN B. NIMMER, I
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE CAN-13 (2002). In either case, the standard
proposed here is one that would eliminate protection for works that evidenced only slight, minimal
negligible creativity.
77. GUTrERMAN & ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 203-04 (describing German copyright law).
78. In a literal sense this may be close to French copyright law which limits protection to
oeuvre de lesprit or works of the mind. See GELLER & NtMMER, supra note 76, at FRA16-FRA17
(2002).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 180-83, 187-89.
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something to recommend it in that it largely eliminates a host of possibly
questionable influences on the determination of what property will be
protected and who the beneficiaries will be. For instance, what is
sufficiently creative is not determined by the tastes of individual judges
or groups of jurors. Any change from the modicum standard requires
consideration of possible creative biases and I address those concerns
below. 0 Still, a generalized preference for minimizing judicial
interference with the allocation of resources for creative purposes means
that it is important to think in terms of neutral ways of raising the
creativity standard.
In the following sections the case is made that: (1) a raised standard
will have no impact on many works that are characterized by low levels
of creativity; (2) a raised standard will increase the variety of creative
efforts; and (3) any decrease in the production of creative works is likely
to come where there are ready substitutes. The issue of neutrality would
not appear to exist if the change in the creativity standard had little or no
impact on the level of creative effort. It is this possibility that is captured
by rules one and two. That is, what is implicit in those rules is that
copyright law, when seen in the light of allocative goals, is actually
overinclusive.
A. A HigherStandardand the Possibilityof Reduced Creativity
1. Commodity Art and Copyright Risk
In order to be effective at lowering distribution-determining costs, a
higher creativity standard would have to eliminate copyright protection
for many works. This is a different question, though, from whether the
works themselves would be eliminated. This leads to the empirical
question of whether and to what extent creativity is copyright-dependent.
Common and observable market phenomena suggest that a great many
works are not dependent on copyright.
Take, for example, a greeting card company preparing to issue its
newest line of Valentine cards, some of which contain original
expressions. The empirical question is whether the success or failure of
the offering is dependent on consumer contact or on protecting the
illustrations on the cards. As an intuitive matter, it does not appear that
the ability to limit the copying of others will have much of a role. Shelf
space, general advertising, point of purchase promotion, mailing lists,

80. See infra Part III.D.
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and means of distribution would seem to be the principle determinants of
consumer exposure and the most important areas of producer
investment. In fact, the most imaginative card possible will go unsold if
not properly marketed, while one visit to a card store proves that
triteness sells if given sufficient exposure. Second, given the generic
nature of the illustrations involved and even required, it is difficult to
fathom that the success or failure of the offering will turn on the
attractiveness of the artwork itself. In fact, for some products there is
probably a narrow range of "acceptable" art, and ventures outside that
range, no matter how imaginative, may be unprofitable. It still may be
profitable for producers to challenge imitators, but that is a different
matter from whether the works will appear at all. In fact, the minimal
creative investment routinely observed in this type of product suggests
that satisficing creativity is the norm and that producers do not see the
investment in the artwork itself as the critical ingredient.
One might argue that the real problem is not with respect to
competing card manufacturers but that, without protection, the work is
free to users for other purposes. For example, the greeting card company
may find its work on a calendar or as a part of the logo for a gift shop.
No doubt the free riding in this type of secondary use seems unfair and it
may be. But even the question of fairness misses the point of whether the
use of the work for those other purposes really threatens the creation of
the original work itself. In instances in which the financial incentive is
more likely linked to a host of marketing considerations and is not a
8
function of copyright per se, this is unlikely to be the case. 1
The proof of copyright-independence is pervasive. It occurs most
frequently in the context of useful articles. As copyright students know,
§ 102 of the 1976 Act lists "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
within the category of things to be protected.82 As a definitional matter,
though,
the design of a useful article, ...

shall be considered a pictorial,

graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.

81.
82.
83.

See Landes & Posner, supranote 66, at 325, 330.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (5) (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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As the cases and commentary on separating the protectable work
from the useful article illustrate, this is not an easy task. 84 The economic
impact of the problem of determining when artwork associated with
useful articles will be protected can be understood by first thinking of
the three possibilities created. Some items, we know, fall well within the
protected areas because they involve a modicum of creativity and have
no function other than carrying the expression. Other items fall clearly in
the unprotected area because they are entirely functional. A basic cubeshaped clothes-washing machine would fall in this category. Finally,
there are items that fall in the gray area, examples of which can be found
throughout case reporters. Put differently, even though the line between
protected works and useful articles is not clear, we do have a rough
guideline that allows us and, more importantly, that allows producers, to
know what falls into the definitely protected area as opposed to the
"maybe" protected and unprotected areas. If creativity is copyrightdependent, one would expect to find a range of creative efforts based on
the level of expected protection.
The incentive is for creativity to be highest where there is a
potential for high levels of protection and for it to fall off significantly as
the risk of no protection enters into the picture. Although uncertainties
and market swings may have an affect on investments in creativity, there
remains for all useful articles a certain level of what might be termed
"copyright risk." In short, investments here may or may not be rewarded,
and the better use of investment dollars would appear to favor different
types of product improvements as there is no assurance that the returns
from creative efforts will be internalized. 85 Although it is impossible to
verify as an empirical matter, a stroll through any department store or
car dealership suggests very powerfully that "copyright risk" has had no
obvious effect. There is no discernable lack of interest in product design
and decoration in the context of useful articles. No toaster, coffee-maker,
or taillight seems to be without a designer's touch of some kind.
This suggests a number of things. The first is that these efforts are
not copyright-dependent. The second is that they are made necessary by
the need to distinguish what are essentially the same products from one

84. See Stephen Langs, The Definitional Scope of an Intrinsic Utilitarian Function Under the
1976 Copyright Act: One Man's Use is Another Man's Art, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 155-64

(1998); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 275-84
(1998).
85. In contrast, the producers who know there will be no gain from copyright protection
would be wise to invest as little as possible in artistic creations unless there is some means other
than copyright protection to capitalize on that investment.
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another in the consumer's mind. Third, there is no logical reason why
artistic distinctions made for product differentiation purposes only are
limited to functional items. That is, having observed creative efforts in
the context of products that are not subject to copyright, there is no
reason to think that copyright becomes relevant simply because a
product may happen to fall within the realm of the copyrightable. In
these vast areas of creativity, moving to a "modicum-times-2" standard
for creativity is unlikely to affect the level of effort because copyright is
not the motivating force. It may, however, lower distributiondetermining costs by decreasing the incidence of opportunistic
infringement actions.86
2. Representational Works
Considerations of creativity lead naturally to the question of how to
treat the author whose wish is to duplicate as exactly as possible another
work, the appearance of a person, or even a scene. Those who are
successful in doing this kind of work may be very skilled. This is not to
say they are necessarily creative or that their work will necessarily
disappear if greater creativity is required for copyright protection. This
question can arise in a number of contexts, the easiest one of which is
the photographer who takes a photograph of another photograph in
hopes of creating a duplicate. The Nimmers list this as one of two
possible types of photographs that should be denied copyright protection
due to a lack of creativity.8 7 What is critical is the effort of the
photographer to capture what has already been created. Another easy
case may be one in which an artist places tracing paper over an existing
work and follows the lines of that work to create another that is similar.
At least as far as the traced elements of the new work, it is difficult to
conclude that anything creative has occurred. In fact, the effort that is
made appears to be designed to avoid creativity.
More difficult to discount as insufficiently creative are works that
fit into the genre of realism-original, as opposed to derivative, works in
which the artist has attempted to create an image that looks exactly like
the actual subject matter. These works are routinely protected and
perhaps should be, but even in the case of these difficult-to-prepare
works it is not clear that creativity is involved or that the works will be
86. These are actions for rents or amounts in excess of that necessary to make the creative
effort worthwhile.
87.

See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][2]

(2003). The Nimmers do suggest, however, that a photograph of a drawing or painting might
receive different treatment. See id.
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lost under a "modicum-times-2" standard. Although these works do not
involve literal tracing, the process of creating a painting or drawing of a
landscape or a person can be the result of a similar process. Early
draftsmen used, and even today artists may use, grid-like devices that are
placed in front of the scene to be depicted. 8 The idea is to segment the
view of what was to be drawn or painted. Thus, rather than paint a barn
or a mountain, one is simply copying a line in one of the segments with
the hope that in combination the lines will duplicate the scene in front of
the artist. Similarly, one of the more important recent books on drawing
touts "[d]rawing on the [r]ight of the [b]rain. ' '89 A crucial step is to
detach oneself from what one thinks he or she is perceiving and draw
exactly what is there. 90 Drawing exactly what is there does mean that
something is produced but, then again, so is the photographed
photograph or the traced drawing. Thus, having produced something is
not a useful test of creativity.
An obvious solution is to regard all of these works as sufficiently
creative as is now, generally, the case. Another solution would be to
deny copyright protection. From the perspective of allocative interests, it
is not clear that the second choice is the wrong one. First, consider the
copyright protection the original artist has. If the depicted scene is
available, it can be painted or photographed by another without
infringing. The only protection for the original stems not from creativity
but from access that will often be determined by resources available.
Having or not having access is hardly what copyright protection turns
on; this part of the effort is unrelated to copyright per se. 91 In fact, the
difficulty of determining whether the new work is from the original
scene or from a copy of the initial work raises distribution-determining
costs. In effect, the original author already has very thin protection from
competitors. Second, many of these types of works will appear as
paintings or drawings. In these instances, the physical embodiment of

at
COLLECTION
THE
Govan,
Grid,
Michael
88. See
http://www.guggenheimcollection.org/site/conceptGrid.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
89. See BETTY EDWARDS, DRAWING ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRAIN (1979).
at 3-4, 6-7. A good example of the problem that this avoids might be the effort to
90. See id.
draw an arm pointing right at the artist. Most people on the first trywill somehow attempt to
represent some segment of the arm itself. In fact, one knows the arm is pointing by seeing the end of
a finger in the foreground and a shoulder in the background.
91. There may still be good reasons to protect the efforts of one who gains access but this
would fall under the question of when we allow an individual to make exclusive use of information
they have uncovered.
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92
the work will have a great deal of value independent of copyright law.
Thus, the thinness of current protection and the possibility of value in
the physical expression of the work suggest that these types of works are
often not motivated by copyright at all. Raising the creativity standard so
that these works are not protected by copyright is not likely to affect
their availability.

B.

The Creativity-ReducingImpact of the Modicum Standard

Although it is unlikely that an elevated standard would result in any
actual or real loss in product variation, it is possible that the modicum
standard itself leads to reduced variation and creativity by rewarding
small efforts. The logic behind this possibility follows from the special
problems presented by derivative works. A derivative work under the
1976 Copyright Act is defined as "a work based upon one or more
granted to a copyright
preexisting works." 93 One of the exclusive rights
94
works.
derivative
create
to
holder is the right
Two cases involving derivative works, L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder95 and Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,96 are useful in illustrating
the allocative/distributive trade-off and the way the modicum standard
may decrease creativity. In Batlin, a 1976 decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Snyder had produced scaled-down
plastic models of an "Uncle Sam" mechanical bank and obtained a
copyright registration. 97 At virtually the same time, Batlin also began
producing plastic scaled-down banks.9 8 Soon thereafter, Batlin was

92. See Landes, supra note 22, at 5 & n.17. Landes also notes that copying of these works
may actually create publicity for the producers and enhance the value of his or her work. On the
other hand, over exposure may reduce the value. See id.at 6.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 103. A fair assumption is that "work" means something that was authored or
created by someone. It isnot yet clear whether the concept of a "work" means that it is copyrighted

or that it was ever copyrighted or even copyrightable. Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found, based exclusively on statutory construction, that for a work to be derivative, it must be based
on a copyrightable work. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1078-80 (9th Cir.
at 1083-84
2000). A strong dissent with respect to this point was authored by Judge Nelson. See id.
(Nelson, J., dissenting). The majority view in Ets-Hokin seems to have been adopted in SHL
Imaging, Inc., v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (following the
Ets-Hokin analysis with respect to "preexisting works," but faulting its misconstruction of the
relationship the putative derivative work must have to the underlying work in order to qualify it as
derivative).
95. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
97. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 488.
98. See id.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:853

informed that his banks were covered by Snyder's copyright.9 9 The
dispute forced the court to consider the problem of creativity in the
context of derivative works. 00 The potential for conflict between
producers of two works that are derivative of the same first work led
Judge Oakes to conclude that, "[a] considerably higher degree of skill
is
1
copyrightable."''
reproduction
the
make
to
skill,
artistic
true
required,
This theme played out more recently in Gracen, in an opinion
authored by Judge Posner for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The plaintiff, Gracen, had entered a competition with other
artists to paint scenes from the movie The Wizard of Oz. 10 2 The artists
were provided with stills from the film to work from, but encouraged to
create their own interpretations-up to a point. 10 3 The winner's painting
was to be reproduced on plates manufactured by the Bradford Exchange.
Gracen prevailed in the competition but was unable to come to terms
with Bradford. 1°4 Bradford engaged another artist who allegedly copied
one of Gracen's paintings. 0 5 The paintings by the new artist became the
bases for the eventual plates that were manufactured and sold. 10 6 0Gracen
7
brought an action claiming that her copyright had been infringed.1
Since Gracen's work was derivative, the issue of infringement
turned on whether she had produced a copyrightable derivative work.
Under a modicum of creativity standard, it would be difficult to create a
derivative work that was not copyrightable: all but an exact copy would
be sufficiently distinguishable to warrant protection. But Judge Posner
warned of what he evidently saw as a different problem. He described a
distinction between the artistic concept of originality and the legal
concept. 1 8 Accordingly, "[a]rtistic originality" could be the result of "a
detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be apprehended by a judge."' 0 9

99. See id.
100. The case originated with Batlin's request for injunction to restrain Snyder from enforcing
his copyright. See id

101.

Id.at491.

102.

See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1983).

103. See id. The new images were to "'evoke all the warm feeling [sic] the people have for the
film and its actors."' Id.
104.

See id.

105. See id.
106. See id.
at 302.
107. See id.
108. See id.at 304. Although expressed in terms of "originality," the analysis focused on what
the author had added to the original in producing the first derivative work; in other words, whether
Gracen created something of significance beyond that found in the original. See id.
at305.
109. Id. at 304.
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On the other hand, "the concept of originality in copyright law has.., a
legal rather than aesthetic function-to prevent overlapping claims."" 0
Judge Posner offered an example similar to this: A group of
painters enter a contest to paint the Mona Lisa. The finished products
might very well look different due to artistic judgments about shading,
color, and other factors."' But, because they are all derivative of the
same work, they will also look alike, creating the potential for multiple
copyright claims. 12 To avoid this problem, Judge Posner reasoned that
"a derivative work must be substantially different from the underlying
'
work to be copyrightable." 13
There are several facets of the Batlin/Gracen analysis that are
important to expand upon. First, although neither Judge Oakes in Batlin
nor Judge Posner in Gracen expressed the issue in these terms, their
analyses ultimately can be seen as a trade-off between allocative and
distributive ends. Both the battles between Snyder and Batlin, on the one
hand, and Gracen and the Bradford Exchange, on the other, were about
distributive matters. In effect, by avoiding "overlapping claims" Judge
Posner's opinion amounts to a decision not to enter into the distributive
fray unless there is something allocatively worthwhile at stake.
Obviously there is more likely to be something allocatively at stake
when the work passes Judge Posner's "substantially different" test or
Judge Oakes' "considerably higher" standard.
Second, although both cases deal with derivative works, the
analysis of the two courts would seem to hold beyond that context. For
example, suppose two painters paint Notre Dame at dawn or the white
cliffs of Dover at twilight. Further suppose they attempt to paint the
scenes to look as realistic as possible." 4 In neither case have the parties
created derivative works. In both cases the parties are likely to create
works that look the same. The same might be true of two photographers
employing the same model or engaging in any work that is realitybased.' 15 The point is that it is not the
derivative nature of the work that
6
1
problem.
Batlin/Gracen
the
creates
110. Id.
111. Seeid.
112. See id. Of course, since access to a work is a critical piece of a successful claim, see, e.g.,
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992), the fact that each artist worked independently
would mean that there is no infringement.
113. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
115. For more on reality-based art, see infra Part IV.B.
116. As noted earlier, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, eliminating copyright
protection may do little to affect the availability of these works.
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The problems of similarities and overlapping claims leading to
distribution-determining costs result not ultimately from the possibility
of derivative works but from the fact that virtually any painter or
photographer can, under the modicum standard, raise a colorable
copyright claim. It is easy to understand this problem by thinking in
terms of two artists each armed with a canvas, one brush, and one color
and permitted to mark on the canvas one time. Clearly the variation
could be substantial but not as broad as that available if they were armed
with a palette of twenty colors and permitted to use as many strokes and
as long a time as desired. In effect, the modicum standard legitimizes
and awards small efforts, and small efforts are more likely to result in
works that look, sound, or read similarly.
If the modicum standard legitimizes small efforts, one would expect
that raising the standard would delegitimize and discourage those efforts.
That does not mean a net loss in creativity. In fact, the opposite may be
true. For example, suppose an artist decides to paint a picture of Edward
Munch's The Scream. This would be a derivative work. Compare his or
her efforts under the modicum rule and the "substantially different" rule.
Under the modicum rule the artist would have a right to claim a property
interest by virtue of painting an exact replica of the original. While that
might be an admirable outcome, it adds nothing as an allocative matter
apart from the actual painting. Under a rule requiring a substantial
difference, in order to claim the property right, the painter must make an
allocative contribution.
This assumes, of course, that each artist has the choice in the matter
of the range of his or her creativity. If this is not true, and it is likely that
it is not in many instances, then there is the possibility that the artist who
is unable to create a work that is substantially different will, being
unable to claim a copyright, not create at all. This simply raises the
question of what we have lost. At most it seems we have lost the efforts
of someone who likely was in the wrong line of work in the first place.
A simple but intriguing case helps make the point. In Gross v.
Seligman,' 17 the court was faced with a fact pattern best suited for a law
class hypothetical. The artist photographed a nude model and sold the
photo, Grace of Youth, and the rights.'1 8 Thereafter, he created a second
photograph of the same model which the court compared with the first as
follows: "The backgrounds are not identical, the model ...was two
years older when the later photograph was taken, and some slight

117. 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
118. Seeidat930.
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changes in the contours of her figure are discoverable."'1 19 In addition, in
the second photo the model is smiling with a cherry stem in her teeth
that was evidently absent in the initial photo. 120 The court reasoned that
the photographer's second effort, even with changes and even 1 if
21
produced strictly from the memory of the first, was infringing.
Accordingly, "the exercise of artistic talent, which made the first
photographic picture a subject of copyright, has been used not to
produce another picture, but to duplicate the original. 122 The opinion
seems correct. The second photo can only be explained in two ways.
First, the photographer was out of new ideas. In effect, the artist's
reservoir of "artistic talent" was depleted. Second, the author, though
capable of more, attempted to recycle the same expression but was wise
to the necessities of the modicum standard. In both cases, there is no net
allocative effect and the loss of the work is unimportant. However, in the
case in which the artist is capable of a new expression there is an even
higher cost. The modicum standard may have "cost" society the benefits
of new creativity by siphoning off creative energy into satisficing
efforts.
More generally, the modicum standard, in many cases, discourages
more adventuresome efforts. If this is the case, there are at least two
arguments that favor an elevated standard. First, in the case of
commodity art, it is unlikely to reduce the amount of creative effort but
will decrease distribution-determining costs. Second, a heightened
standard requires those with creative potential to aim higher. Ideally, the
"modicum-times-2" standard would eliminate a "least necessary" or
satisficing analysis whereby the author considers, as in Gross, how little
can be done for a work to be copyrightable or to avoid infringing an
existing work. This is not to say that the artist will not want to consider
these factors at some point, but the beginning point should not be a
consideration of how little one must do to produce something
copyrightable. Removing the "least necessary" analysis or elevating
what "least" means has another important advantage. The creator whose
goal is not merely to differentiate his or her product is less likely to copy
in the first place and less likely to create an infringing work even if it
turns out to be identical to an existing work.
There may be some concern that what I am suggesting goes too far
in a specific area of expression. For example, suppose a particular artist
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at931.
See id.
at 930.
Seeid.at931.
Id.
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is known for his or her watercolors of flowers and, in fact, produces a
series devoted to the tulip. All of these works will, by necessity, be
considerably similar. In fact, like the variations found in Gross, an
argument may exist that each watercolor is not really a new effort but a
repeated expression of the same work with minimal variations. This type
of problem is presented in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art
Exchange.1 23 A wildlife artist painted and sold the rights to a work
entitled "Cardinals on Apple Blossom." 124 Later he painted a series of
birds, one of which was entitled "The Cardinal."'' 2 5 The holder of the
rights to "Cardinal on Apple Blossom" claimed the subsequent painting
was an infringement. 126 In creating both paintings the artist relied on
substantially the same materials-photographs, slides, and a working
drawing. 27 There was no evidence that the artist worked from the
original. 128 Nor did the court rely on the "copied from memory" analysis
of the Gross court. Instead, it noted that the birds in the second painting
were positioned differently, were depicted
with different attitudes, and
29
were surrounded by different foliage. 1
The distinction between the effort in Gross and in Franklin Mint
may seem to be a matter of degree suggesting that the decision could go
either way in either case. But this would amount to a very superficial
interpretation. In Gross, with a subject matter that was amenable to a
virtually limitless number of expressions, the photographer selected one
that was nearly identical to an existing expression. His desire seems to
have been to be as uncreative as permissible. In Franklin Mint, the
subject matter itself created limitations on the range of expression. One
cardinal looks pretty much like another; they are typically found in trees
and their relatively small, compact bodies do not allow for a great
variety of poses. In short, whatever danger might be created for
"specialists" would seem to be minimized as long as the higher standard
I am suggesting is contextualized.
This is not to say the danger of having these works fail the
"modicum-times-2" test is eliminated or even should be. In terms of
allocative interests, there is no doubt a kind of aesthetic-diminishing

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
See id. at 63.
Seeid. at64.
Seeid at63.
See id.
See id.
See Franklin, 575 F.2d at 66.
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return that sets in even for the cardinal. 130 Thus, while the painter in
Frankin Mint may have done all that can be done with the subject
matter, there will be a point at which all works depicting cardinals or
those derived from depictions of cardinals will look very similar. This
gives rise to distribution-determining costs with not much in the way of
an allocative payoff. In fact, the cardinal example brings us back to the
Batlin/Gracen problem of overlapping works. To the individual artists
this may seem harsh but in the context of the overall consideration of
societal welfare, it is appropriate. As beautiful as the cardinal is, there is
in fact a limit on the extent to which society benefits from yet another
depiction.
C. Monopolistically Competitive and Monopolistic Art
The analysis thus far has emphasized that raising the creativity
requirement, rather than decreasing the amount of creativity, will leave it
unaffected or actually increase it. The issue of a higher standard is more
controversial when the possibility is that it will decrease some creative
efforts. It is important not to overestimate this possibility. As already
indicated, many creative efforts are not copyright-dependent. In
addition, if there are losses, they may take place "at the margin" and
primarily affect areas in which there are good substitutes.
Specifically, many works have a monopolistically competitive
character and present us with the question of how much, if at all, they
would be missed. Analogies to this possibility are pervasive. Any
college town of decent size seems to have a multitude of sources for
pizza, each a little different from the other. A walk down any grocery
store aisle reveals more brands and variations of each fruit, vegetable,
and salad dressing than one can possibly use. On nearly every corner
there are gas stations, convenience stores, dry cleaners, or fast food
outlets. Although each may have a slight claim to exclusivity, it is not
freedom from being copied that drives this variety. Moreover, it is not at
all clear that one or two fewer offerings would make a difference in
terms of overall social welfare.
The label "monopolistic competition" is misleading because firms
in these industries bear little in common with actual monopolists. In the
case of monopoly, there is only one supplier of a good or service for
which there are no substitutes. Barriers to entry are typically high. If
demand conditions are right, a monopolist can earn supra-competitive
130.

There would remain an interest in and a market for the original form of the expression,

and this would exist independent of copyright.
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profits for extended periods of time. In most instances, competitors
eventually will be attracted into the market and the monopolist will lose
its market power. Monopolistic competitors, on the other hand, are
surrounded by sellers of good substitutes, entry is easy, and the prospect
for long-term profits is rather dismal.
There are pros and cons of monopolistic competition. Clearly there
is much to be said for variety and the quest to find some product feature
that will make one's product more satisfying to consumers than a
competitor's product. On the other hand, there are good arguments based
on price theory that firms operating under monopolistically competitive
conditions operate at inefficient levels of production.' 3' In addition, there
are significant incentives to create what are ultimately false perceptions
of product distinctions. A key element of monopolistic competition
.seems to be an effort to raise transaction or search costs for consumers.
One of the basic ideas is to hide the fact from consumers that different
cereals, pizzas, hamburgers, dry cleaning, etc. are essentially the same.
The costs to consumers of cutting through the information fog and
paying higher than competitive prices for goods and services that may be
substantially indistinguishable comes with the territory of permitting the
market to operate. The costs and the waste involved can be viewed as the
price paid for variety. Like gaining a copyright, the crucial element of
monopolistic competition is the ease of entry into the industry.' 32 In
effect, any firm that enters and profits by its product differentiation is
faced with the inevitable entry of competitors who will imitate and
ultimately bid down prices so profits disappear.
It is easy to see that much of what falls within the copyright laws is
the expressive equivalent of monopolistic competition. Under the
modicum standard, small variations among what are ultimately fungible
works qualify for copyright protection. In effect, a trivial difference is
one's ticket into the fray, and this permits one to claim at least some
short-term profit. When one thinks of the "art" in a great many fabric
patterns, beach towels, photographs, paintings, and greeting cards, it is
hard to see the benefits as different from those created by establishing
the tenth pizza delivery service in a college town. Yet copyright law
provides the incentive and. the forum for the disputes to which these
trivial matters lead. In fact, unlike the usual market forces in
monopolistic competition that quickly allow substitutes to enter the

131.
2001).
132.

See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 426-27 (5th ed.
Seeid. at424.
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market, copyright-for life plus seventy years-permits the author to
invoke public sector assistance in retarding entry.
Consider, for instance, Beaudin v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade,
Inc., 33 in which Beaudin, the designer of hats marked by cow-like
blotches, claimed that a line of hats offered by the Ben and Jerry's ice
cream company infringed. 134 The appellate court ultimately made the
right decision in upholding the lower court's view that there was no
infringement. 135 It reasoned that the protection for a work containing
only a slight level of creation was "thin" and that Ben and Jerry's had
not pierced the thin layer of protection. 136 The case seems like an easy
one, but even relatively easy decisions are costly. Thus, what the
modicum standard suggested to Beaudin was that for life plus seventy
years he could claim the exclusive use of depictions of the spots on a
cow, at least on hats. The larger question then is whether the trivial,
virtually unlimited, and faddish "competitors" copyright produces are
worth the cost.
Another case illustrates the monopolistically competitive nature of
copyright. North Coast Industries v. Jason Maxwell, Inc. 137 involved a
dispute between two clothing manufacturers, both of whom were using
fabric designs reminiscent of the work of Piet Mondrian. 138 The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant had infringed by creating print that was very
similar to its own. 139 The defendant's response was that the defendant's
design itself was not copyrightable due to its similarity to the paintings
of Mondrian and the fabrics used in the 1960s by designer Yves St.
Laurent. 140 The three relevant designs are set out below in Figure 1.
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95 F.3d I (2d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1-2.
See id. at 2.
Seeid.
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Seeid. at 1032.
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FIGURE 1
41
A. Yves St. Laurent rendition1

142
B. North Coast Industries design

143
C. Allegedly Infringing design

The crucial issue in the case came down to whether the plaintiffs
work was sufficiently original. Or, in the words of the court, "whether
the difference between that copyrighted work and the preexisting work is
non-trivial.' ' 144 The lower court had held that the differences between the
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id at 1036.
See id at 1037.
See id. at 1038.
Id. at 1033.
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plaintiffs work and that of Mondrian and St. Laurent were trivial based
on the view that the "only variations.., were the location of the vertical
band and the proportion of the rectangular shapes."'' 45 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected this view, reasoning, in effect, that a finding
that the plaintiffs work did not have more than trivial distinctions from
the original would be comparable to saying that once Mondrian had
painted his first work, none of the rest along the same theme could be
viewed as possessing more than trivial distinctions. 146 The court
and it cannot be the
reasoned that "this is not the judgment of art history,
' 14 7
correct judgment of a court as a matter of law."
Traditionally, the Ninth Circuit applies a more lenient view of what
is copyrightable as a derivative work than the Batlin/Gracen line of
reasoning discussed above. 148 Thus, the decision is hardly surprising, but
it does point out the awkward reasoning that may follow from a
modicum standard. In particular, the analogy to the Mondrian originals
makes little sense for two reasons. First, original works, even in a court
following the Batlin/Gracen approach to derivative works, are likely to
be subject to a lower standard of creativity. Second, in terms of the role
of copyright in providing an incentive, works that are associated with the
original embodiment-a painting, sculpture, etc.-have non-copyright
protection by virtue of their scarcity. In short, perhaps, some Mondrians
would not pass the test of creativity but it likely would not matter with
respect to whether they would be prepared in the first place.
This aside, Beaudin and North Coast Industries provide one with a
feel for the more generalized problem of monopolistically competitive
art. To understand it further, it is useful to note some simple aspects of
monopoly. First, although we claim to dislike monopoly, in reality we
are ambivalent. In a very real sense, we value it because it is a means of
encouraging meaningful investment in research and development. In
other words, it enables individuals to recoup and profit from investment.
In fact, it is bedrock antitrust law that monopoly per se is beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws. 149 Second, unless there is an antitrust
145. Id. at 1034.
146. See id.
at 1035.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that tiles made by cutting out copyrighted reproductions of an author's original works from
a licensed commemorative book, pasting these images onto the tiles, and laminating them were not
copyrightable derivative works).
149. Instead, the antitrust laws forbid achieving and maintaining monopoly power through
means that do not ultimately benefit consumers. See, e.g., Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.Ct. 872, 879 (2004).
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violation, a monopoly can last until substitute suppliers become
available. This is a function of the barriers to entry. Third, the
profitability of monopoly is what leads to its ultimate downfall as
investors, seeing the profit to be made, attempt to serve the same
consumer needs the monopoly responds to.
The monopolistically competitive character of copyright can be
traced to the fact that it affords creative people with less than monopolytype protection. Even a massive creative effort that is fully protected
does not guarantee market power in the technical sense. Any author of a
failed novel or painter of ignored works can attest to this. Thus, the
modicum standard does more than permit monopolistically competitive
creative efforts. It also may make these limited efforts seem sensible
because the protection afforded other competitors is itself so limited.
Although I am not proposing to grant authors monopoly power, I am
saying that it may make sense to break copyright out of the
monopolistically competitive mold. In terms of conventional markets,
the issue is whether the system should encourage a tenth, eleventh, or
twelfth pizza delivery service or if it should 0encourage greater efforts to
improve the quality of food more generally.15
Except in rare instances, copyright is probably not capable of
providing authors with true market or monopoly power in an economic
sense. Copyright can, however, move in this direction by affording those
who are responsible for creative advances with more of an entry barrier
than currently exists. To understand how, it is useful to understand that
an entry barrier has two components. The first is the breadth of the
protection. By this I mean how "thick" or "thin" the protection is with
respect to the substance of the work or how close another author would
have to come to the original to be viewed as infringing. If only very
close similarity would amount to copying, then the market power would
be greater. For example, the court in Beaudin'5 1 provided thin protection
due to the limited contribution of the artist. The other element of the
entry barrier is time. Life plus seventy years creates more potential
power than life plus fifty years.
Time and the breadth of protection complement each other. Thus,
the same level of protection could be created with very thick protection
for a short time period or with very thin protection for an extended time
150. It is still probably not correct to think in terms of copyright holders as monopolists as
there are very few, if any, copyrighted works that satisfy a need that cannot be satisfied by other
services and products in the market. The existence of these substitutes undermines true monopoly
power.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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period. For example, if Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet today, one
might allow him exclusive use of the star-crossed-lovers-from-feudingfamilies theme for five years. As an investor, Shakespeare might be
indifferent between that option and a very thin one-say, on some of the
dialogue only-for two hundred years. In theory, there is an infinite
range of possible combinations that deliver the same level of protection.
In effect, Shakespeare could be a near monopolist for five years or a
monopolistic competitor for two hundred.
The analysis works in a more macro sense as well. The copyright
laws are structured in a way to channel a given quantum of creativity
into a variety of directions. It may seem odd to think in terms of a finite
level of creative effort, but to think otherwise is to suggest that we want
to maximize creative effort at all times. This would be terribly inefficient
in the case of those who are not very creative, to say nothing of leaving
all other utility-producing endeavors undone. In any case, whatever that
hypothetical level, it could be achieved by a continuum of possibilities
ranging from holding out very thin and short-term protection to anyone
with a trivial contribution to offering thick and long-term protection to
those with far more meritorious works. The people in this latter category
152
might actually be granted something like real economic market power,
but only if they produce more than a modicum of creativity.
The response to this may be to ask: why not do all of these things?
That is, why not continue thin protection for those with thin works and
thick protection for those with more creative efforts? There are two
answers to this. The first, as suggested in the preceding section, is that
we may not have to make the choice if, as I have suggested, the
motivating force for many thin works is not copyright protection at all.
The second is that it is a question of priorities. It is a misuse of resources
both to encourage talented people into satisficing creative choices and to
hold out false hopes to those capable of only uninspired efforts. Put
differently, given a finite level of creative energy, how do we want that
energy to be directed? Bringing the analysis back to the concepts of
monopolistic competition and monopoly, is it preferable to have even
more Mondrian-influenced fabric patterns (which may be with us in any
case) or more purely original designs?
Given the limited ability of copyright to create actual market
power, the next question is whether copyright is equipped at all to

152. This should be distinguished from a property right. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary
and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727,
1730-31 (2000).
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increase the thickness of protection sufficiently to encourage
developmental change over simple variation. There are some obvious
possibilities, all of which would require careful consideration but none
of which are obviously workable. One is to blur the idea-expression
distinction. In short, it may make sense in some instances to permit
authors to own a piece of the idea. For example, having written Romeo
and Juliet, one could say that it is an infringement for future authors to
write a play about star-crossed lovers from feuding families that ends
tragically at least for some period of time. This would begin to create
some monopoly or market power for Shakespeare, although even then
there would be substitute forms of entertainment, and even plays, with
tragic endings. While attractive in theory perhaps, the complexity of this
distinction and of the application of the merger doctrine generally
counsel against an effort in this direction beyond affording the creative
person some benefit of the doubt.
Another less difficult option includes shorter copyright protection
for less creative works. The problem with this proposal is that the
rewards for the creative person come at the end of the copyright terms
when possible income flows are already discounted at high rates. Just
adding even multiple years would not have much impact at the margin.
In addition, although this Article argues for a higher creativity standard,
this particular proposal would envision a series of creativity levels. The
complexity would likely give rise to huge new distribution-determining
costs, the very thing this Article seeks to lower.
This leaves one to consider whether simply raising the standard to a
"modicum-times-2" alone might provide some element of market power.
I have described this standard as "greater than minimal skill, taste or
judgment" and "distinguishable from ordinary works." However stated,
the goal is to make generic efforts less attractive but, even if they
continue, to keep the largely irrelevant distributive issues they raise out
of the courts. The proposal also has the advantage of affecting
distribution-determining costs at their highest and least productive level.
For example, one could think of the results of creative efforts as taking
on a pyramid form. The bottom of the creative pyramid is the widest and
the most effective measure and would be one that affects this huge
bottom layer. In fact, the hoped-for outcome would be to provide an
incentive for creative people to avoid the bottom layer by elevating their
level of creativity. The element of the proposal that hits hardest at the
monopolistically competitive character of currently copyrightable works
is the requirement that the work be "distinguishable from ordinary
works." The substance of the requirement is to not provide copyright to
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works for which there are likely to be many good substitutes. The other
half of the process is to provide real protection for works that are
distinguishable. These works are the easiest for courts to protect because
of their individuality. In effect, the higher standard may channel authors
into works that are inherently more likely to afford them market power if
properly protected by the courts.
D. Judicial Values in Copyright
The initial reaction of some to raising the creativity standard to,
say, a "modicum-times-2" may be that judicial value judgments will be
brought to bear. These judgments, so the argument would go, would tend
to favor the type of art and creative expression with which judges-a
predominately white, educated, and affluent group-are comfortable.
And, if the market incentives are as economists suppose them to be, one
would expect more of the favored expression and less of the disfavored.
In more economic terms, judges could guide investment decisions in
creativity. As in the case of proving any negative, it is impossible to
completely lay these claims to rest. Still, there are a number of reasons
to be cautious about overstating the dangers.
First, judicial involvement in the issue of what is a copyrightable
expression is not the same as involvement in the expression itself.
Presumably those who feel strongly or passionately about a particular
point of view will not be deterred that their expression of that view may
be copied by others. Clearly it is not copyright per se or the courts that
determine the influence of one's work. It is, instead, the ability to
disseminate those ideas through print and over the airwaves that
provides the greater concern. In fact, if one's concern is about decreased
diversity in expression and the dissemination of ideas, the focus should
be on different levels of access to the media and the resulting anti153
democratic influences.
Second, if one thinks about the impact of a "modicum-times-2"
standard at more than a barely superficial level, it becomes clear that
rather than decreasing diversity in expression it should increase it.
Again, putting it in terms of investment decisions, the risk to the author
of little or no return is increased to the extent the work is similar to
existing works. One way to decrease this risk is to ratchet up one's
creative efforts.

153. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchyand Copyright in Our System of
Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879 (2000).
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Finally, a concern that a "modicum-times-2" standard will alter the
copyright landscape misses the point that courts are already in the
process of making this deserving/undeserving decision and there is little
sign that it is substance-based. In fact, a convincing case can be made
that the "modicum-times-2" standard is already applied, but that it enters
the analysis at a variety of points. This is true with respect to three
separate areas of analysis, two of which relate to fair use. For example,
the first step of the fair use test involves an examination of whether the
otherwise infringing work is "transformative." Being transformative is
necessary but not sufficient to bring a work under the fair use
exemption. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,154 the Supreme Court
articulated a standard that clearly requires an assessment of value. Thus,
the question was seen as "whether the new work merely 'supercede[s]
the objects' of the original creation, .. . or instead adds something new,

with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is 'transformative." ' "55 Similarly, in SunTrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,156 the court noted that the transformative
use standard involved an assessment of "'the value generated by the
secondary use and the means by which such value is generated.""90 57 In
short, certainly something akin to a "modicum-times-2" standard is
applied when determining whether the second work is transformative.
At least ideally, the issue of transformativity is not substance-based.
A recent case, Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 58 illustrates this. The court addressed

the fair use defense raised by a party who took the heads from Barbie
dolls and painted and adorned them to create dolls (Dungeon Dolls) with
a sado-masochistic theme. 159 According to the court, the "[d]efendant's
'touch-ups' of the dolls plus the setting she creates for them transform,
the original doll to an extent beyond merely
to put it mildly,
160
'supplanting' it.'

Value and a "modicum-times-2"-like standard also enters into the
fair use analysis at the second of the four steps: "the nature of the
copyrighted work."' 161 In effect, by Congressional mandate, courts are
154.

510U.S.569(1994).

155. Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
156. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
157. Id. at 1372 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d
Cir. 1994).
158. 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
159. Seeid. at318,321.
160. Id. at 322.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
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already thrust into the position of distinguishing works with existing
copyrights from others. Some works are less available for fair use than
others. Thus, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' 62 the Supreme
Court noted that "[t]his factor calls for recognition that some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.' 63 The
Court quoted Folsum v. Marsh,164 in which Justice Story noted the
inescapable truth that courts must "look to the... quantity and value of
the materials used.' 65 Although Justice Story in Folsum and the Court
in Acuff-Rose applied their reasoning in the context of a fair use analysis,
the analysis has important implications for the issue of copyrightability
itself. A finding that a work is more available for fair use is one that
lowers its value just as a finding might be that the work fails the
"modicum-times-2" test. Conversely, a finding that the work is close to
the core value of copyright is one that raises its value by insulating it
from others. In effect, those works that are more creative have more
powerful copyright protection.
Most of the cases addressing the "nature of the copyrighted work"
question have focused on whether that work could be seen as principally
a creative effort or more fact-oriented. For example, in Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' 66 the Court
distinguished between a news broadcast and a motion picture, with the
former deserving less protection. 67 Similarly, in Stewart v. Abend, 168 the
169
distinction was between a fictional short story and factual works.
More generally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brewer v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.170 distinguished between "informational works of general
interest to the public" and "works [that] are creative products."' 7 1 This
informational, as opposed to creative, distinction can also be seen at the
heart of a "modicum-times-2" standard. For example, a work that
involves minimal creativity is one that is common, easy to come by, and,
thus, quasi-factual in nature and further from the core interests of
copyright.
162. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
163. Id. at 586.
164. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
165. Id. at 348.
166. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
167. See id.
at 455 n.40 (owing to a motion picture's potential for additional markets beyond its
initial purpose and, therefore, its greater susceptibility to "commercial harm").
168. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
169. See id. at 237-38; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,
542-43, 563 (1985).
170. 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
171. Id.at529.
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Finally, relatively recent legislation requires courts to make very
clear choices based on merit. Under the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 ("VARA"), 172 artists may prevent the destruction of their works
that are of "recognized stature."173 Although the statute has been applied
infrequently and judicial discussion is sparse, 174 its existence suggests
that slightly higher standards for creativity and authorship would hardly
shock the system of copyright jurisprudence.
What this suggests is two things. First, applying a "modicum-times2" standard at the initial phase of copyright would not require a new
approach. The type of analysis involved already takes place. Second,
these examples indicate that a decision about creativity need not be the
same as whether the work is ultimately worthwhile. A judge who is
willing to recognize and respect that distinction will be unlikely to
change his or her approach depending on the point at which the decision
is made.
IV.

AUTHORSHIP

The second prong of the detrivializing process addresses the
question of authorship. The problem of authorship has received a fair
amount of scholarly attention175 but has not received any serious judicial
scrutiny in some time. Judicial interpretations typically focus on the
work itself with the author generally defined as the one responsible for
the existence of the work. Thus, from Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v.
Sarony 176 comes the definition of author as "'he to whom anything owes
its origin.' ' 1 77 This type of definition has no functional relevance with
respect to determining a rational set of copyright goals. The effect of
such a definition is essentially to read "author" out of the Copyright Act.
In fact, the notion of authorship has been so thoroughly underplayed that

172. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107,
113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (2000)).
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000).
174. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995); Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1999).
175. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OwNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author"forPurposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 1323 (1996); Yen, supra note 84.
176. 111 U.S. 53(1884).
177. Id. at 57-58 (citation omitted). The rather broad definition is narrowed later in the opinion,
see id. at 59-60, and also by Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991). In fact, the Feist Court cites Burrow-Giles for the proposition that an author cannot be
merely a "discoverer." See id.at 347-48.
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one can evidently become an author without intending to do so. At least
this is the import of the language in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 1 8 in which the court argues that copiers of other works may
become authors as a consequence of "bad eyesight, or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder" which having
unintentionally," the "'author' may adopt it as his and
created "variation
179
copyright it.'

Just how seriously one should take the "adopted accident" theory of
authorship is not clear. For its proposition, the Alfred Bell court cites
Kallen's Art and Freedom'80 and a story therein about a painter who is
unable to achieve a desired effect in a painting and, in anger, throws a
sponge at the painting which then leads to the desired result.' 81 This is
hardly the "clap of thunder" the Alfred Bell court suggests in that the
critical element in the Kallen example, but missing from the court's
"thunderclap," is a preconception of what the desired effect would be. In
fairness, the Alfred Bell court does note that the issue of intention is not
completely clear. 182 Thus it cites an earlier decision by the Court of
183
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp.,
which explains the issue: "If one made an unintentional error in copying
which he perceived to add distinctiveness to the product, he might
perhaps obtain a valid copyright on his copy, although the question
would then84 arise whether originality is precluded by lack of
intention."'

'

The proposed definition offered here is that an author is one who
"expresses a previously conceived notion involving skill, taste or
judgment." Preconception is the key because, without preconception, the
link between effort and allocative ends is largely lost. Under this
standard, it may not be possible to be an "author" of something that is
"discovered and adopted" as opposed to something that is created. In
fact, "discovered and adopted" seems significantly at odds with a notion
of creativity that suggests the expression begins with the author as
opposed to existing outside of the author who then puts his or her name
on it.

178.
179.
180.

191 F.2d99(2dCir. 1951).
Id. at 105.
HORACE M. KALLEN, 2 ART AND FREEDOM (2d ed. 1943).

181.

191 F.2dat 105 n.23.

182.
183.
184.

Seeid. at 104-05.
150F.2d512(2dCir. 1945).
150 F.2d at 513.
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The idea that authorship begins with something internal to and
about which the author has some consciousness is hardly new. Although
initially stating a very broad notion of authorship, the Burrow-Giles
Court notes that copyrightable works include "all forms of writing... by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression. 18 5 And again, when contrasting copyright law and patent
law, the Court notes the importance of "intellectual production, of
thought, and conception on the part of the author., 186 Finally, the Court
holds that photographs are copyrightable "so far as they are
' 87
representatives of the original intellectual conceptions of the author."'
The view proposed here and expressed by the Burrow-Giles Court
may be best understood by comparing it to a recent effort to focus on the
concept of "author" by Russ VerSteeg.188 In reviewing the 1976 Act,
VerSteeg reasons, "[t]o ascertain whether someone is an author, we must
ask whether he has communicated original expression ....That is what
makes someone a copyright author." 18 9 VerSteeg continues, "although
conceptualization generally may precede the act of communication, it is
not a compulsory antecedent to becoming an author under the 1976
Act.", 190

I think VerSteeg is probably right as far as the 1976 Act goes. One
can evidently become an author after the fact. One could, for example,
absentmindedly walk through wet cement and then decide to preserve
his or her "creativity" for all time. The problem with this view of
copyright is that it seems to protect much more than necessary when the
issues are viewed in terms of the allocative and distributive distinction.
A functional authorship requirement would be one that awards a
deliberate, cognitive effort. It would award people for doing what they
intend to do and not for what they "happen" to do nor for producing
events that involve creation over which they have no conscious
involvement.
This definition is also intended to steer clear of copyright based on
the sweat of the brow. For example, a photographer may toss his or her
camera in the air with the shutter timed to snap in mid-flight. After a few
185. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
186. Id.at 59-60. In addition, the decision to find the photographs in Burrow-Giles
copyrightable stems from a finding of fact that the photographer attempted to evoke desired images.
See id
187. Id.at 58.
188. See VerSteeg, supra note 176, at 1365.
189. Id.
190. Id.VerSteeg compares this with the approach of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in
which the cognitive process of the author was crucial. See id at 1362-64.

2004]

RATIONALIZING COPYRIGHT

hundred tries, he or she may find an image that is intriguing and claim it
as a copyrightable work. One could argue that the photo is the result of a
cognitive effort. I would say that the only originality involved goes to
the discovery of a method of snapping photos. In addition, the time spent
on both failed and "successful" efforts may have constituted sweat of the
brow but, there was insufficient connection between the author's
creative impulses, if any, and the eventual intriguing photograph. In
short, to be allocatively relevant in terms of drawing forth creativity,
there must be a connectedness between the end product and a conception
of the author that existed before creation. Connectedness can exist
between the individual and an original process but the process is not the
same as expression.
In this section, I focus on two types of authorship that seem to fall
outside the realm of authorship. The first deals with instances in which
the author captures an expression or sequence that is unintentional. The
second deals with instances in which the author attempts to create an
expression but knows beforehand that he or she does not know what that
expression will be. The reasons for eliminating these works from
copyright protection vary in how compelling they are and I discuss them
in the order of most to least compelling.
A. Unintended Outcomes
There are instances in which a person, perhaps not even trying to
act as an author, attempts to make one expression and winds up with
another. The problem is that this cannot be motivated by an effort to
enrich society more generally since no one "sets out" to do what he or
she had no intention of doing. In these instances there may be an
argument that, without copyright protection, the fortuitous author would
not bother to make his or her creation public. There may be instances in
which this argument has some weight but, by and large, it is not very
compelling. The author who experiences a windfall can bury it and
receive nothing or make it public for a price if the market is so willing.
The impact of denying copyright merely lowers that price. This is
irrelevant given that the costs incurred in the creation are now sunk, on
the one hand, and the opportunity cost of making the work available is
zero.
Perhaps the best known example of this copyright problem and a
good illustration of the dangers of eliminating an authorship requirement
is the famed Zapruder film. As indicated in Part I, Zapruder planned to
film the motorcade of President John Kennedy in Dallas on November

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 32:853

22, 1963. In all likelihood, had things gone as planned, he would have
created a film worth very little. As it turns out, he captured the
assassination on film and sold it to Life magazine for $150,000.191 In
assessing a challenge to the copyright of the film, the court did not
address the issue of authorship directly. Instead, it replied to an
argument that the film contained no "'elements' personal to
Zapruder. '1 92 While seeming to indirectly raise the authorship issue, the
court then discussed photography more generally and veered off course
in two respects. First, the court relied as a guideline on a quotation by
Nimmer suggesting that photographs were copyrightable owing to the
selection by the photographer of "subject matter, angle of photograph,
lighting and determination of the precise time when the photograph is to
be taken. 1 93 Zapruder's lack of connection with what actually created
value in the film and which ultimately gave rise to the distributiondetermining costs seemed to be lost on the court.
Second is the court's reasoning that, had Zapruder photographed
what he intended to photograph, he would certainly be entitled to
copyright protection.' 94 And, given this, on what basis could copyright
be denied when he captured something different? 195 From a functional or
allocative perspective, the answer seems clear. Zapruder intended to film
the motorcade and possessed an authorial preconception. Had the film
been noteworthy his internalization of the benefits would have been
allocatively sound. Since Zapruder played no role in the selection of the
only element of the film that turned out to be what was allocatively
important, there was no allocatively-based rationale for his exclusive
internalization. More generally, if copyright is viewed as encouraging
authors for the benefit of society, there was no utility in granting
Zapruder a copyright. The film was hardly Zapruder's expression but
was an after-the-fact and windfall outcome of a completely different
intention.
The issue of authorship is forgotten or finessed in the court's
response to the argument that Zapruder had not been creative. The court
reasoned that Zapruder had decided to make a film as opposed to taking
still photos. In addition, he selected the type of film and camera type as

191.
192.

193.
194.

See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142 (quoting NIMMERON COPYRIGHT).
See id. at 143.

195. The court asks, "[o]n what principle can it be denied because of the tragic event it
records?" Id.
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well as the time and place.' 96 If this is sufficient for copyright then it
suggests that two other possibilities would also be sufficient as far as
authorship. Suppose a photographer selects a camera and film and lens
and puts it all in a camera bag. A dog walks on the bag causing the
camera shutter to snap. Using the court's reasoning the photograph
would be copyrightable. 9 7 More extreme, if the necessary elements are
satisfied by collecting various inputs together, it is not clear why the
photo has to be taken at all. After all, the only elements for which the
photographer is responsible are independent of the image actually
produced. 198 That argument, however, would read everything out of the
Copyright Act except a requirement that something be fixed.' 99
The problem with the court's reasoning lies not simply in the fact
that its authorship analysis focuses on a means to an end when, as it
turns out, the desired end did not materialize. What it shows more
generally is the danger of the absence of an authorship analysis. More
particularly, in terms of Zapruder and the earlier "adopt as your own"
analyses of authorship, the authorship requirement seems to be viewed
as requiring little more than being present at the birth of a tangible
recording. Again, the notion of copyright as principally a means to social
benefits would seem to require an incentive or motivational element that
can only be captured if the outcome of the effort is linked to the author's
intent. This may be best illustrated by considering the impact on
Zapruder-like film events if a cognitive authorship requirement were
adopted. Would it mean that works, like the Zapruder film, would not be
produced? This seems unlikely if not impossible. If Zapruder cannot
anticipate the outcome, it stands to reason that no change in the
copyright laws or their interpretation would stop the outcome.
Although it seems fairly clear that an approach to copyright that
focuses on social welfare would include a preconception requirement, a
series of additional questions are raised. Would the preconception
requirement mean that all photographs or sound recording of events over

196. See id.
197. According to Jennifer T. Olsson, as of 1992, the copyrightability of such an image had not
been established one way or the other. See Jennifer T. Olsson, Note, Rights in Fine Art
Photography: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (1992).
198. Copyright requires that the expression be fixed. Thus, one could not copyright the nonphotograph. Fixing, however, is independent from creativity and authorship, since it principally
lowers the cost of administering a system of copyright.
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). "[T]he concept of fixation is important since it not only
determines whether the provisions of the statute apply to a work, but it also represents the dividing
line between common law and statutory protection." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
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which the author has no -control lack the requisite authorship?
Seemingly, this would exclude many kinds of news videotapes or
photos. And it could exclude the non-professional who sees an event
unfolding and has a camera or video recorder handy. Although I will
later question whether these types of works should be copyrightable, in
the context of a comparison to Zapruder, all of these instances are ones
that do involve authorship. Not only would the author have taken the
steps listed by the Zapruder court, but there would be the critical element
of intent in that the events captured would not be the result of
happenstance or luck. z°0
A second and similar issue is raised in a scenario in which I carry a
video recorder in my car and stop to record a tornado several miles
away. As I am filming, a car wreck, unrelated to the tornado, takes place
in front of the camera. This is much closer to the Zapruder case and
certainly illustrates the line-drawing difficulties a meaningful authorship
requirement may present. In this rather stylized case, the logic would be
to deny copyright protection for the auto wreck and allow it for the
tornado. Creation of the tornado film requires all the factors described by
the court in Zapruder as well as decisions about framing the images and
the length of the exposure and, most importantly, choice of subject
matter. On the other hand, the photos of the car wreck are not authored.
Even though creative choices were made, they were made independent
of that image. Again, employing this functional approach to authorship
will not mean the photo of the car wreck is not preserved. It does,
however, assure that the photos of the tornados will be taken in the first
place.20 1
A final matter to consider is when, if ever, the unintended and
unexpected is adopted as one's own for copyright purposes. There are
very few examples like Zapruder in which the entire work is an
unintended outcome of an effort to produce another work. In fact, this
possibility seems to exist primarily when the creative effort is combined
with some natural or unnatural influence lying outside the author. On the
other hand, if one begins to break down a work, there may be a number
of unintended elements. Several elements within a work could be the

200. From this one might reason that Zapruder became an author at the point he realized what
was taking place before his camera and chose to continue filming.
201. Granting copyright protection in this case would be very close to protecting the images of
someone who simply suspends a running video camera on light post and inspects the images
periodically to see if anything "interesting" has been photographed. As I argue in the section below,
the creative person here is better viewed as having invented a method of capturing images but has
no artistic claim to the images themselves.
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result of Alfred Bell's "clap of thunder." For example, the artist may
intend to draw a straight line and accidentally draws a curved one. There
are actually two ways this could occur. First, the artist may be
attempting to create a copy of an existing work and simply fail to create
an exact copy of the original. Second, the author may be attempting to
create an entirely original work but, in the course of execution, fail to
accurately communicate what he or she intended. This second case is
relatively easy; the fact that the artist does not intend the curved line
does not preclude the entire work from copyright protection. There may
be many other elements or the author may have chosen to make a
compilation of errors.
The difficult case is the first one in which the author's mistake
occurs in the context of a representational or derivative work.2 °2 In fact,
most extreme is the type of situation alluded to by the Alfred Bell Court.
As described above, the court held that the originality in a derivative
20 3
work could be found in an accidental and unintended variation.
Whatever import that passage in the opinion has today is questionable
given the tendency of some courts to require greater originality in a
derivative work than merely a modicum. 20 4 Still, the sentiment found in
Alfred Bell serves again to illustrate the gap in copyright by a failure to
focus on authorship. For instance, under the Alfred Bell reasoning, the
successful copyist would have no protection because his work would not
be original. The bungling copyist, on the other hand, would produce a
copyrightable work. At best this is an awkward result and would seem to
reward the less talented individual whose efforts are far less likely to be
responsive to incentives.
This outcome is the result of focusing on creativity while deemphasizing authorship and missing its independent importance. In fact,
the thunderstruck copyist does produce something original. 20 5 The
thunderstruck copyist is, however, not an author in the sense of
communicating an idea, impression, or conception that existed before it
was recorded.

202. The matter of representational art was also addressed in the context of creativity. See
supra Part III.A.2.
203. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
204. See supratext accompanying notes 98-119.
205. In the narrow sense of not having copied the work of another.
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B. Aleatory Art and Process
Some creations are the result of imaginative ways of gathering
sounds or images. By themselves, the instances in which these "works"
are called into question are not significant, but they are worth discussing
because there may be a way to connect them to other efforts that are
significant. In fact, what I suggest here is that there is a continuum of
possibilities in which works come into existence by virtue of "process"
as opposed to authorship. As one moves across this continuum, there is
both process and authorship and then eventually a predominance of
authorship. Works that are purely process-related, as described here, are
the sort that unnecessarily raise distribution-determining costs by
permitting protection of random outcomes. The question is whether only
works that are purely process should be excluded from copyright
protection or whether the exclusion should extend to works that are
predominately "process" as opposed to authored.20 6
One example of imaginative gathering and process is the John Cage
composition 4'33," mentioned in Part II.A, in which the performance
was silence, and periodic movement of the lid to the piano keys, with the
silence broken by whatever occurred. Similarly, a photographer could
set up a camera on a street comer and equip it with a timer that would
snap the shutter every few seconds or minutes. Or one could set up
sound recording equipment in a forest and record naturally occurring
sounds.20 7 In all of these instances the artist essentially gathers images or
sounds. He or she is not the author of the sound or images because they
did not begin from within. Instead the work is a function of what is
found outside the author's creative capabilities. This does not mean that
process-works are necessarily worthless or uninteresting. They may, in
fact, turn out to be fascinating and uplifting as many things found in
nature are. 208
The rationale for not extending copyright protection to these efforts
can be understood by first focusing on what the individual did originate
and then on the output. What the individual originated is a process of
gatheringhopefully intriguing, entertaining, or useful sounds or images.
Thus, if protection is to be extended to the individual's creative
instincts-something that was preconceived and has the author's
206.

For an argument that process-oriented works are deserving of copyright, see Durham,

supra note 40, at 624-34.

207.

Among the copyrighted recorded sound collections available commercially are ones that

feature birds and other wildlife, waterfall, and automobiles.
208. And as the discussion of creativity suggests, many of these works may come into
existence whether or not copyrightable. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
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personal stamp-it would have to be to this process. The process itself,
however, cannot be fixed.2 °9 More importantly, like ideas in a more
conventional setting, the way a process of this type is manifested is by
the work it produces. For example, to say that John Cage's 4'33" is
copyrightable is to say that Cage has a monopoly on sitting in front of a
piano and listening to whatever sounds occur. Thus, while one might
argue (an argument with which I disagree) that a recording, which is
fixed, of the sounds occurring during a performance is copyrightable,
one cannot take the next step of saying that the process of sitting quietly
in order to collect any ambient sounds that may occur is
copyrightable. 2 10 To suggest otherwise would seem to rule that any new
effort to collect naturally occurring sounds would be an infringement.
One might say that it is not an infringement if one goes to a forest to
record wildlife as opposed to the concert hall to collect whatever occurs
there, but that would mean infringement would turn on the location of
the sound recorder when the gatherer elected to turn it on while
remaining silent.
A further reason for not in effect permitting the process to be
copyrighted stems from the fact that the process is like a machine that is
used in a manufacturing process. In principle it is not distinguishable
from machines or processes producing other goods and services. To
elevate a process above others simply on the basis of the senses to which
its output appeals is a distinction without any underlying basis.
The second element of the rationale for not protecting these efforts
has to do with the character of the sounds or images themselves. Being
the gatherer of sounds or images does not make one the creator, whether
the sounds or images occur in an otherwise quiet concert hall or in a
jungle. The sounds recorded are comparable to facts in a more orthodox
setting in that they simply exist, waiting to be found.2 ' In fact, these
images cannot be authored even though they may be original in the sense
of being unlike prior works. 21 2 In effect, the gatherer has captured
209. It can be described, of course, and the expression of that description may be protectable.
Whether the process itself is patentable is a different question but, even if it is, there are likely to be
numerous ways of gathering the same sounds or images.
210. Nor, as I explain below, see infra text accompanying notes 218-20, is the recording itself
protectable.
211. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc.v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991).
212. The Nimmers list two instances in which a photograph would be insufficiently original to
warrant copyright protection. The first is an effort to photograph another photograph or printed
material. The other is an effect to produce a photograph that attempts to use all the elements of a
prior photograph. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 2.08[E][2]. Under the standard
suggested here, both cases might involve authorship in the sense that a preconception existed. The
problem is that the preconception is not original.
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already existing data in the form of a sound or image and over which he
or she had no control. The fact that it may have taken substantial effort
to find the right image means that the gatherer has taken on a researchlike project. But neither the research nor the captured data are the subject
of authorship.
Process and uncontrolled sounds or images characterize one end of
the authorial continuum. Examples of "works" at this end are not
common and even here there are weak arguments for their
copyrightability. For example, even though 4'33" comes closest to pure
process, one can reason that a decision about the length of time involves
an authorial choice. The problem with viewing the timing decision as a
type of authorship illustrates the shortcomings of squeezing other
gathering attempts into the authorship mold. The length requirement is
one imposed by outside factors, including in some cases the hope that
the product will be commercially viable. The "author" does not make the
decision that the time must be limited, only what the limited time will
be. Other choices are also required by the nature of the work itself.
While these choices have some authorial element, they do not rank as
highly as true creative choices.
Moreover, there is considerable force to the argument that these
types of choices should not count at all. For example, if the contribution
of the author is timing then, presumably, timing would be protected. If
the only contribution of a photographer is the size of the image or its
graininess, the same issue arises. Does it make sense to protect
contextual elements when the central element is not the subject of
authorship? Moving to the examples of the photo machine or forest
sounds alluded to above, the possible choices are increased and the work
arguably pushed out from the extreme edge of the continuum by virtue
of the sheer number of decisions. But this really is not a meaningful
change. Obviously, exposures, film choice, lenses, and the like are not
independently protectable. They are simply methods or styles for
providing a context in which to present the captured information that the
author did not create. 13 Without a central copyrightable element, they
are like containers with nothing inside.

213. The same analysis would apply to works in the genre of Duchamp's ready-mades. The
underlying image or presentation is not copyrightable due to a lack of authorship, at least by the one
who had adopted the item for display. The novel display itself could be copyrighted but only to the
extent that it is original. The idea of an authorized reproduction, unless it is verbatim copying,
makes little sense. The difference between Duchamp's ready-mades and someone pointing out an
interesting feature of passing scenery is that the former is arguably "fixing." Fixing alone, however,
does not render a work copyrightable. See also GELLER & NIMMER, supranote 76, at SWI-I 9-SWI-
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In both photography and sound reproduction cases, there are two
ways of pushing the producer out on the continuum to the point of
achieving some element of authorship. Having captured a number of
images or sounds, the processor may then choose from the collection and
manipulate, alter, or enhance the original in order to create a new
expression of the same image. Or, to carry forth the research/fact
analogy, having employed a specific research methodology, the producer
may choose which facts to present and how to present them. The fact
that the processor can have no ownership of the underlying image
suggests that the work produced is akin to a derivative work.2 14 The
original image is free to all. This approach has some appeal because the
status of the new work as a derivative work, if treated as suggested here
and by the Ninth and Second Circuits, would mean the work is afforded
limited protection and thus the potential for creating distributiondetermining costs declines.
One might object to this view by arguing that even the most
ardently worked-on photograph or sound recording that is not a result of
preconception seems to fall into the allocatively-irrelevant Alfred Bell
adopt-a-mistake theory of authorship. The answer to this possible
conflict can be understood by focusing on the similarity of the original
image to a fact and on the treatment afforded historical novels and the
like.2t5 The author cannot adopt a fact as his or her own, and it does not
make any sense from the point of view of allocative interests to permit
him or her to adopt the unanticipated photo as his or her own. On the
other hand, the photograph that is eventually produced may have
elements that are comparable to telling a story that contains those facts.
Thus, the candid photo as well as the candid sound recording would
move the processor away from the production-only end of the
continuum. 216 Still, it makes little sense to offer the processor more than
thin protection owing to the absence of authorship of the underlying
images or sounds.

20. Geller and Nimmer ask, in the case of ready-mades "whether there is something in this object
susceptible of being misappropriated so as to infringe copyright" and conclude that there is not. Id.
214. See generally Olsson, supranote 198.
215. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that research involved in uncovering facts is no more protected by the copyright laws than
the facts themselves); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)
(same); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1966) (same).
216. One could take a more extreme view of this and argue that without a claim to the original
image, the photographer is unable to create anything that is copyrightable, no matter what form it is
eventually produced in. This, however, seems to deny the existence of authorial input. In any case, I
do not think much turns on the view expressed in the text and the view expressed here.
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Another approach to these kinds of works stems from the fact that
they are oft times found in collections. Thus, a group of photographs
may be selected and presented in a certain way. Similarly, a collection of
sounds may be edited and presented as a collection. Consistent with
conventional copyright standards, these works would edge out from the
production-only extreme of the continuum. Here again, however,
protection would be very thin; extended only to the arrangement of what
are essentially facts.
To be sure, there are gray areas of this analysis and specific
problems to be addressed. One gray area is the case of candid
photographs. In a sense, all or nearly all photographs have an aleatory
quality in that the photographer cannot know what will be produced until
examining the negative and at that point he or she may accept or reject
the work. Still, even in the case of candid snapshots there would seem to
be some authorial element. For example, suppose someone takes a series
of photographs at a birthday party without giving any one of the photos a
great deal of thought. One possibility is that the photographer sees a
child eating cake and snaps the shutter without saying a word. In the
second, the photographer sees the child and says, "could you look this
way" or "hold it." A variation of this could be moving around the subject
in order to get the desired angle or to compose the shot in a certain way.
All of these possibilities can be distinguished from the photography
machine in that there exists a preconception of the eventual image. Thus,
photographers, although perhaps exercising little in the way of choice,
are, at least arguably, authors.
On the other hand, has the photographer, especially the one who
says

nothing,

done

anything

more than record

a fact? 2 17 The

photographer buys the appropriate film like a researcher buys the proper
note card and pen. Composing the shot is like choosing the column on
which to record the information. In a sense, the photographer may be
seen as doing no more than the minimum necessary to record the fact.
An analogy with respect to more conventional facts might be someone
taking a survey and recording on paper the number of Chevrolets that
pass an intersection. The minimum necessary to record and preserve a
fact would not create copyright in the fact itself. Under this analysis, the

217. If so, then the photograph may be grouped along with other representational art and the
arguments made earlier with respect to a lack of creativity would apply. See supra text
accompanying notes 34-38.
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underlying image, although perhaps not the specific print of that image,
would be available to all.2 18
The possibility that the photographer of candid images is not an
author leads to the issue of whether newsreel footage should be viewed
as authored for copyright purposes. 2 19 As with the parent at the birthday
party, the photographer is recording facts, and a lack of participation in
the occurrence of those facts actually may be critical to the integrity of
the work. Only in a general sense, and even less so than in the birthday
party, can the photographer be said to have had a preconception of the
work.
In the context of a thesis that copyright standards should be applied
to emphasize allocative over distributive goals, this may seem
counterintuitive. Newsreels have great historical significance and are
important as an allocative matter. It is tempting to go off the tracks here
and conclude that something is wrong with the preconception standard
for authorship if it does not protect newsreel footage. This, however,
misses a critical point. A great deal of what people produce is not
covered by copyright but is produced nonetheless. The same may very
well be true with newsreels. Although the'market value of these efforts
may decline, there is no reason to believe that all financial incentive will
be removed.
There is, in addition, a more subtle point to be made here and one
that is impossible to quantify. The level of newsgathering efforts, and
most other'productive efforts for that matter, are a function of the profits
earned. To suggest that it would be inappropriate to lower available
profits and the level of newsgathering presupposes that the existing
levels are efficient. The question of what level is the efficient one is not
something than can be gleaned from copyright law itself, which is but a
means to the end of achieving an appropriate level. For example, while it
is true that without copyright, efforts to obtain candid news photos and
film might decline, this may not be unequivocally bad. In fact, the
current levels may be viewed as artificially high owing to copyright
protection. Clearly, when one thinks in terms of creativity, originality,
and authorship, the encouragement of those who record current events
218. The distinction here has been made by SHL Imaging, Inc., v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), in which the court notes that a photographer is protected only to the
extent of his or her "incremental contribution." Id. at 3 11 (citation omitted). This means that only
"verbatim copying" would be an infringement. Id.
219. It seems well settled that newsreels are copyrightable under current law and its
interpretation. For an example of such an incident giving rise to distribution determining costs, see
Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television International,Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
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does not leap to mind as the central focus of copyright. In any case,
copyright law itself cannot provide the answer to the normative question
of how much protection is enough.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In a general sense, the elevation of distributive issues as an end in
themselves as opposed to a means to allocative gains can be traced to the
market problem copyright seeks to cure and the imperfect solution
copyright law provides. That problem is that creators of intellectual
property typically, though not always, are unable to fully internalize or
profit by their efforts. If they are unable to internalize due to the copying
or free riding of others, the incentive to create will be lost or severely
decreased.
The aim of copyright law can be seen as bringing creators of
intellectual property into line with the producers of conventional
welfare-enhancing goods and services. And it would perhaps be ideal if
some kind of parity could be established. The key is to provide an entry
barrier for authors-in the form of infringement actions-comparable to
entry barriers in conventional markets. Conventional markets
automatically distinguish among various producers. Individuals with
limited abilities-say a construction worker-find that they must
compete with others as a matter of course. And those with special
skills-say a star quarterback-are the beneficiaries of their skill and the
barriers that keep others from duplicating them. Copyright duplicates
this up to a point. Those with little to say or who prepare works based on
the works of others should not expect to be able to stem the tide of
competitors. Those with a great deal to say should be able to expect to
gain from their talents. Copyright law provides the entry barrier that
makes this possible, though not inevitable. Barely interesting works get
little protection while hugely creative works benefit by a greater entry
barrier. In a sense, each author would seem to create his or her own entry
barrier by virtue of the quantity and quality of his or her creative efforts.
The system breaks down, however, when virtually anyone can
make a claim to exclusivity. This is the case in copyright due to minimal
creativity standards and the virtual elimination of an authorship
requirement. The lure of entry-barrier-based gains for even modicumlevel work means that a great deal of effort may be devoted to satisficing
as opposed to maximizing creativity. Satisficing efforts, more than fully
creative efforts, are likely to result in barely distinguishable works. In
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these instances there are costly disputes over the distribution of income
that are unrelated to any allocative gain or generalized benefit to society.
Increased emphasis on allocative interests over distributive ones
can be approached by focusing on the now greatly watered-down
standards for creativity and authorship. The principle goals are to limit
copyright protection for works whose existence is not copyrightdependent, works for which there are likely to be many substitutes, and
"works" that are unconnected to the creator's preconception. The means
of achieving these ends is the implementation of a "modicum-times-2"
standard of creativity and to provide a link between the work and the
intent of the artist. The "modicum-times-2" standard discourages
distribution-cost-increasing works that have minor allocative
importance. In addition, to the extent satisficing creative behavior takes
place, it will increase the level of creativity. The preconception standard
for authorship is necessary in order for copyright
to have the incentive
220
effect the Constitution and courts require.

220. Recently, Professor Alan L. Durham wrote, "[i]t is easy to say that works lacking that
cognitive element are not works of authorship; it is surprisingly difficult to say why not." Durham,

supra note 40, at 574. The answer, as suggested here, is that without a cognitive element, the
justification for public subsidization of a system of copyright becomes extremely weak.

